GDG- Buford at Fairfield

[William Hewitt]

Tom-
Your point is a good one.

One of the distance studies shows that the AOP was not a very mobile army.
It averaged less than 6 miles a day while one the march as an army.  While
there were days a single corps or two could march much further, the
remaining corps contributed to this average.  When Meade took over the
average more than doubled. Army's kind of develop their own peculiarities
over time.  How the western armies were different than the AOP and James,
while they were all taught at the same institution etc.  

A combination of your point and my point would easily explain apparent lack
of urgency.  Lee made a comment to Trimble and Ewell about where the battle
might be fought in the 25-26 June timeframe.  Both comments indicate that
Lee thought his army could march over 3 times the mileage per day than the
AOP.  Lee had a mindset that the other side in incapable of marching.  It is
good that a commander studies the ways of his enemy, and explains a bit why
Lee was comfortable with dividing his force at Chancellorsville.  He was
reasonable certain the AOP would remain and not come out of the woods.  A
new commander can change those patterns though.  

Not to change the subject, but Lee did not see the new fighting skills of
the AOP on 1 and 2 July either.  In past, the AOP would have withdrawn after
the 2 July attack, but did not.  Yet 3 July happened.  Back to 1 July.

So Lee's mindset led him to a conclusion that the AOP could not yet be near
Gettysburg in force.  He even after hearing the guns at Cashtown, did not go
forward quickly.  Once the mind is set, it can be the hardest of things to
change.  What was an impossibility now becomes reality. Hard to accept
impossible things. The lesson here it that it is good never to think
something is impossible, only improbable. Cornwallis at Cowpens.  Pemberton
at Vicksburg.  And Custer at LBH?  German attack in DEC 44.     It can take
time for reality to overcome the mindset.

One of the challenges with your point is that Lee's scouts knew where they
were when they made their report.  That is they had a map and were using it
when they briefed Lee (I'd wager).  We only have the written word.  

Bill



 



Message: 12
Date: Fri, 9 May 2008 23:31:55 -0500
From: "frdm35" <frdm35 at comcast.net>

Message: 15
Date: Sat, 10 May 2008 11:13:26 -0400
From: "Tom Ryan" <pennmardel at mchsi.com>
Subject: RE: GDG- BUford at Cashtown
To: "GDG" <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Message-ID: <FEEOKINCPINMNKHDCDCEAEOGDKAA.pennmardel at mchsi.com>
Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"

Bill,

What seems to be missing is a lack of urgency on Lee's part considering the
fact that his scouts (as well as Hill's scouts) had reported that the Union
army has progressed to the point that they are only 15 miles down the road
in Middleburg -- and, of course, presumably they are moving further
northward as they speak.

So the question is why would Lee leave the decision to Hill regarding if and
when Ewell should turn off from his move toward Cashtown in the direction of
Gettysburg?  It seems that Lee should have been on top of this situation
with direct orders to both Hill and Ewell to occupy Gettysburg immediately
in order to be in control at that location.

The entire sequence of Lee's actions seems a little pro forma for the man
who outmaneuvered McClellan, Pope and Hooker in past situations.

There is one clue that is intriguing, and may explain Lee's seeming
casualness in this situation.  In Heth's SHSP article he mentioned that the
enemy having reached Middleburg was still 30 miles away.  Since Middleburg
is only 15 miles from Gettysburg, why would Heth have made that statement?

I think he may have confused Middleburg with Middletown which was about 30
miles away and where two Union corps were located on June 29, the day the
scouts would have gone out on their recon.  If Lee believed that the AoP had
not moved from its previous position in the Middletown/Frederick area, then
he would have thought he had plenty of time to check out what was happening
in Gettysburg.  Therefore, he approved Hill's sending a recon-in-force under
Heth to see who those people were that Pettigrew had found in Gettysburg the
previous day, and allowed Hill and Ewell to coordinate on where to
concentrate.

What do you think?

Regards, Tom