GDG- BUford at Cashtown

[Tom Ryan]

Bill,

What seems to be missing is a lack of urgency on Lee's part considering the
fact that his scouts (as well as Hill's scouts) had reported that the Union
army has progressed to the point that they are only 15 miles down the road
in Middleburg -- and, of course, presumably they are moving further
northward as they speak.

So the question is why would Lee leave the decision to Hill regarding if and
when Ewell should turn off from his move toward Cashtown in the direction of
Gettysburg?  It seems that Lee should have been on top of this situation
with direct orders to both Hill and Ewell to occupy Gettysburg immediately
in order to be in control at that location.

The entire sequence of Lee's actions seems a little pro forma for the man
who outmaneuvered McClellan, Pope and Hooker in past situations.

There is one clue that is intriguing, and may explain Lee's seeming
casualness in this situation.  In Heth's SHSP article he mentioned that the
enemy having reached Middleburg was still 30 miles away.  Since Middleburg
is only 15 miles from Gettysburg, why would Heth have made that statement?

I think he may have confused Middleburg with Middletown which was about 30
miles away and where two Union corps were located on June 29, the day the
scouts would have gone out on their recon.  If Lee believed that the AoP had
not moved from its previous position in the Middletown/Frederick area, then
he would have thought he had plenty of time to check out what was happening
in Gettysburg.  Therefore, he approved Hill's sending a recon-in-force under
Heth to see who those people were that Pettigrew had found in Gettysburg the
previous day, and allowed Hill and Ewell to coordinate on where to
concentrate.

What do you think?

Regards, Tom

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of William Hewitt
Sent: Saturday, May 10, 2008 6:35 AM
To: gettysburg at arthes.com
Subject: GDG- BUford at Cashtown


Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Tom-
It has always been of interest to me as to why Ewell seemed to emphasize
Cashtown when Lee orders said "or Gettysburg" as dictated by circumstances.
(SIC) Perhaps the conflict was in Ewell's mind rather than Lee's.  I always
read "Cashtown or Gettysburg" as a sequential choice, with Cashtown being a
"waypoint".  Once Cashtown was secured, and situation allows, unite at
Gettysburg.

After uniting his force, control of the road hub was the next obvious
tactical target. Ewell, (usually a stickler for military courtesy) came
around quickly when informed by a junior officer (Hill, who was one day his
junior) that Gettysburg was now the immediate goal.  He sent a courier
(Campbell Brown, I think) to ensure Lee knew he (Ewell) understood and
turned force southward without awaiting guidance (or confirmation) from Lee.

Let's see where we are with the force.  By 8 am Lee is near Fayetteville,
unscrewing the traffic jam, with most of Longstreet strung out from
Fayetteville to Chambersburg.  Johnson, leading Ewell's trains in now on the
road.  Anderson is clearing the Cashtown Pass with his combat force and
Pender is closing on Heth.  So Cashtown is now "overcome by events" if not
by 8 am, soon thereafter.

Now, I would like to know where Lee was from 8 to noon when he shows up in
Cashtown.  If these times are right, Lee was obviously not in any hurry.
BUT, BUT, BUT---- he had started out early enough from Messerschmidt Woods
to be where he needed when Hill and Ewell united.  He had anticipated his
decision point and was attempting to get there at the expected time.

I always wondered if Lee had sent a courier to tell Hill to tell Ewell to
turn south.  Is Hill being presumptive to tell the senior (Ewell) what to do
without guidance? Did Lee, during the 30 June meeting with Hill, give him
some guidance that once he cleared Cashtown to inform Ewell to unite at
Gettysburg? FOR SOME REASON Hill is confidant and comfortable guiding Ewell.
Ewell starts turning south around 11 am, so Hill wrote the note at or before
(about 10 am).

There surely is something not documented, that we are missing.


Regards, Bill



Bill,

That is an excellent analysis, and one that I generally agree with.  It just
struck me as curious that Lee would allow Ewell to start out from
Heidlersburg on the morning of July 1 still apparently heading for Cashtown
before Lee notified him to change course for Gettysburg because Hill was
engaged there.  I am basing this on Ewell's report (OR, 27, II, p. 444).

That does not make sense.  What was Lee's motivation?  Did he forget about
Ewell, and have to make an adjustment at the last minute?  Was he hesitating
about where he wanted to fight a battle?

Perhaps he was still lulled by the belief the Union army was still far
enough away that he did not need to be particularly concerned.  Even so, you
would think that he would want to get control of Gettysburg and its road
network, rather than concentrating the army at Cashtown -- even if he did
not intend to fight a battle there.

In other words, if Heth had not gone into Gettysburg and made contact with
Buford's cavalry, Ewell would have continued on to Cashtown to join the rest
of the army.  And all this time Gettysburg would have been unoccupied.

There is a certain lack of astuteness on Lee's part regarding the run-up to
the eventual clash at Gettysburg that seems peculiar for someone with a past
record of being able to assess the situation clearly and forthrightly, and
thereby gaining the advantage.  This seems to me not so much the absence of
Stuart and the intelligence he normally provided, but more a sluggishness in
the way Lee was approaching the situation.

Regards, Tom



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