GDG- BUford at Cashtown

[William Hewitt]

Tom-
It has always been of interest to me as to why Ewell seemed to emphasize
Cashtown when Lee orders said "or Gettysburg" as dictated by circumstances.
(SIC) Perhaps the conflict was in Ewell's mind rather than Lee's.  I always
read "Cashtown or Gettysburg" as a sequential choice, with Cashtown being a
"waypoint".  Once Cashtown was secured, and situation allows, unite at
Gettysburg.   

After uniting his force, control of the road hub was the next obvious
tactical target. Ewell, (usually a stickler for military courtesy) came
around quickly when informed by a junior officer (Hill, who was one day his
junior) that Gettysburg was now the immediate goal.  He sent a courier
(Campbell Brown, I think) to ensure Lee knew he (Ewell) understood and
turned force southward without awaiting guidance (or confirmation) from Lee.

Let's see where we are with the force.  By 8 am Lee is near Fayetteville,
unscrewing the traffic jam, with most of Longstreet strung out from
Fayetteville to Chambersburg.  Johnson, leading Ewell's trains in now on the
road.  Anderson is clearing the Cashtown Pass with his combat force and
Pender is closing on Heth.  So Cashtown is now "overcome by events" if not
by 8 am, soon thereafter.

Now, I would like to know where Lee was from 8 to noon when he shows up in
Cashtown.  If these times are right, Lee was obviously not in any hurry.
BUT, BUT, BUT---- he had started out early enough from Messerschmidt Woods
to be where he needed when Hill and Ewell united.  He had anticipated his
decision point and was attempting to get there at the expected time.

I always wondered if Lee had sent a courier to tell Hill to tell Ewell to
turn south.  Is Hill being presumptive to tell the senior (Ewell) what to do
without guidance? Did Lee, during the 30 June meeting with Hill, give him
some guidance that once he cleared Cashtown to inform Ewell to unite at
Gettysburg? FOR SOME REASON Hill is confidant and comfortable guiding Ewell.
Ewell starts turning south around 11 am, so Hill wrote the note at or before
(about 10 am). 

There surely is something not documented, that we are missing. 

  
Regards, Bill



Bill,

That is an excellent analysis, and one that I generally agree with.  It just
struck me as curious that Lee would allow Ewell to start out from
Heidlersburg on the morning of July 1 still apparently heading for Cashtown
before Lee notified him to change course for Gettysburg because Hill was
engaged there.  I am basing this on Ewell's report (OR, 27, II, p. 444).

That does not make sense.  What was Lee's motivation?  Did he forget about
Ewell, and have to make an adjustment at the last minute?  Was he hesitating
about where he wanted to fight a battle?

Perhaps he was still lulled by the belief the Union army was still far
enough away that he did not need to be particularly concerned.  Even so, you
would think that he would want to get control of Gettysburg and its road
network, rather than concentrating the army at Cashtown -- even if he did
not intend to fight a battle there.

In other words, if Heth had not gone into Gettysburg and made contact with
Buford's cavalry, Ewell would have continued on to Cashtown to join the rest
of the army.  And all this time Gettysburg would have been unoccupied.

There is a certain lack of astuteness on Lee's part regarding the run-up to
the eventual clash at Gettysburg that seems peculiar for someone with a past
record of being able to assess the situation clearly and forthrightly, and
thereby gaining the advantage.  This seems to me not so much the absence of
Stuart and the intelligence he normally provided, but more a sluggishness in
the way Lee was approaching the situation.

Regards, Tom