GDG- Lee's Inconsistencies at GB

[John Baniszewski]

SNIP

Many of the recent posts have appeared to question Lee's leadership inconsistencies at GB. We seem unable to understand why an aggressive usually successful CG acts so out of character. We seem to be searching to something to which his uncharacteristic performance can be attributed. The range of reasons usually given include: the new ANV organization; vacilating subordinate commanders; bad staff work; poor reconnaissance; etc. Was GB's outcome the result of a bad game for Lee or really due to the Union army rising above itself and performing well?  Lee generally sought to achieve surprise and demoralize his opponent through flank attacks. He consistently used or tried to use this tactic during the 7 days, at 2nd Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness. However, at GB he refuses Longstreet's request to attack the AoP's left flank. Could Meade, the AoP's David, really have beaten Lee, the ANV's Goliath, on any other field? 
   UNSNIP
  I think it was a combination of Lee performing much more poorly than normal, and the Union Army performing better than it ever had before.  
    The improvement in the Union senior leadership team (not just the commanding general, but also the Corp commanders) is often overlooked.  If you compare the membership of that team in July 1863 with the membership in December 1862, you see a 100% change in membership, most of it for the better (much better).  I don’t think the Union Army “rose above” itself – I think it finally rose up to, and stayed at, a level of high competence.  Not more competent than the ANV in 1864 and 1865, but essentially equal.
    I think the more interesting question is why Lee performed so much below average.  If you contrast the Lee of Antietam with the Lee of Gettysburg, the differences are remarkable.  
    I have become convinced that Lee was seriously physically debilitated on July 1 and 2, and only started to recover on the 3rd.  The evidence is circumstantial, but I think it is there.  Lt Col Freemantle’s description of Lee on Day 2 said - “Generally he sat quite alone on the stump of a tree.  What I remarked especially was, that during the whole time the firing continued, he only sent one message, and received one report.  It is evidently his system to arrange the plan thoroughly with (his subordinates), and then leave to them the duty of modifying and carrying it out to the best of their abilities”.  This was the first time Fremantle had ever seen Lee in action, so he had no basis for comparison. This is so unlike the Lee of Antietam, I think the cause was not Lee’s choice of style, but a physical debilitation.  
    The evening of July 2, Lee did not meet with Longstreet, after one of the fiercest days of combat in the entire war.  This too is very uncharacteristic, and not what he did at Antietam.  I think that this, too, was the result of disability, and not Lee’s preference.
    I think the most convincing evidence comes from Lee’s offer of resignation, in which he says – “No one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position.  I am becoming more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal supervision of the operations in the field which I feel to be necessary.  I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled”.  
    Joe Hooker tried to command at Chancellorsville after receiving a concussion.  Jackson fought the Seven Days battles in a state of exhaustion, due to the strains of the Valley campaign.  Both performed well below their normal level.  Physical health of a commander is a crucial factor in the middle of a battle.
    I believe is the type of man who would try to conceal his physical difficulties, if he thought his leadership was truly needed.  As bad as he felt at Gettysburg, he sucked it up and did the best he was capable of, but his physical condition prevented him from demonstrating his usual capability.  In the past, some people have almost brushed off Lee’s resignation letter, treating it as more of a formality, than a real admission of a problem Lee was loathe to admit.  I take Lee’s words at their face value.
    John Baniszewski
  

John Baniszewski