GDG- Day 2- What was Ewell Thinking?

[Margaret D. Blough]

>>Lee bemoans his inability to get everyone working together "in concert."
Surely this must have been an example.  I would love to know what the
group thinks.  Thanks, and looking forward to it.

David
 
David G. Smith, Ph.D.
(703) 807-2849
smith_david_g at bah.com<<

If you look at the Seven Days a year earlier, the Confederates had similar communication and coordination problems but, fortunately for them, they were up against George McClellan and his chronic panic disorder.  I don't think Lee felt he had much of a choice about going to three corps after Jackson's death, but I do think he could have made much more of an effort to coordinate and keep a closer eye on the two inexperienced corps commanders at Gettysburg.  This wasn't Longstreet and Jackson who, no matter how different they were, were used to working as part of a team under Lee and could be trusted with a great deal of discretion.  He should have been having meetings with his commanders, not in the sense of giving them a vote, but making sure that they and he shared all available information and that they understood his plans for the battle before they left so that, as my late father used to say, they were all singing out of the same hymnbook.  This was particularly important consi
dering that, for once, they no longer had the home field advantage.

Regards,

Margaret
 


-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: "Smith, David [USA]" <smith_david_g at bah.com> 

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes: 
> 
> 
> Here's a question I have that is somewhat related to the Sickles' 
> controversy but I hope will start a new string. 
> 
> According Lee's plan as I understand it, Ewell was supposed to "advance 
> at the sound of the guns" with Longstreet's attack. But he didn't. Why 
> not? 
> 
> I had this elaborate theory worked out that Ewell was expecting to hear 
> the sounds of the guns get closer, but when the axis of the attack was 
> changed from down the Emittsburg Road to toward Little Round Top, he 
> didn't quite hear the sounds he expected (and noise on the battlefield 
> can be very confusing - sometimes it can sound closer or further away 
> than it was) - and so he held up. That's maybe where Sickles move comes 
> in. 
> 
> Then I looked at Pfanz and found out that Ewell apparently watched the 
> whole thing from the Lutheran Seminary cupola. So he didn't need the 
> noise at all (isn't it great how facts can get in the way of a beloved 
> theory?) So why didn't Ewell promptly attack? - I suspect the breakdown 
> of the en echelon attack as the attack transitioned from Longstreet's to 
> Hill's corps had something to do with that. Did Ewell think he was the 
> last part of the en echelon attack? But weren't his orders to advance 
> right away? As it was, he advanced against positions where troops had 
> been stripped. And perhaps his success persuaded Lee to attack on the 
> third day. 
> 
> Lee bemoans his inability to get everyone working together "in concert." 
> Surely this must have been an example. I would love to know what the 
> group thinks. Thanks, and looking forward to it. 
> 
> David 
> 
> David G. Smith, Ph.D. 
> (703) 807-2849 
> smith_david_g at bah.com 
> 
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
> You may unsubscribe by going to 
> http://mailman.arthes.com/mailman/listinfo/gettysburg 
> 
> You can add yourself to the GDG map at: 
> http://www.frappr.com/gettysburgdiscussiongroup 
> 
> View archived posts from May 2004 - present at 
> http://mailman.arthes.com/pipermail/gettysburg/