GDG- If Sickles had stayed put!

[Margaret D. Blough]

>>In other words, the line did have its advantages.  But unless and until 
Meade had enough troops on the field to do so, he could not afford to take 
up that line.


Jim Cameron<<

That is part of what has always bothered me about Sickles' rationalization for his actions because, even if he felt he didn't have enough men to properly man the line he was assigned (and I believe we've both taken Wayne Wachsmuth's tour where he very convincingly sets forth the case that Sickles never took his assigned position, not to be confused with where the Third Corps bivouaced), he took them to a line that would have required even more soldiers to man adequately, and, complaining that the removal of the cavalry left him with a flank in the air, he not only moves to a position where both flanks are unsupported but, by doing so, leaves the Second Corps with a flank in the air.

Regards,

Margaret


-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: James Cameron <cameron2 at optonline.net> 

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes: 
> 
> 
> << Sickles' orders from Meade early in the morning of 2 July, were the same 
> orders he received from Slocum when he arrived on the field around 1900, 
> 1 July, and those orders were to relieve Geary's division (two 
> brigades). 
> If anyone can show me a copy of any other orders to Sickles from Meade, 
> I would appreciate it. >> 
> 
> Unless one discounts verbal orders or the sketch map given the corps 
> commanders. 
> 
> BTW, can you show us a copy of the deployment orders from Meade to any other 
> corps commanders? 
> 
> << Sickles and his staff spent the entire morning and early afternoon 
> attempting to get Meade to understand that Geary's men had not been in 
> any defensive position, and they were awaiting an inspection or at least 
> new orders from the CG. With no guidance from Meade forthcoming, 
> Sickles made his own decisions as events on his front developed. 
> Just after 1100, Meade sent Hunt with Sickles to help locate artillery 
> positions on a new line. Hunt thought highly of the new position, and 
> recommended that Meade inspect it, which he did not do. >> 
> 
> No guidance? How much more guidance was needed beyond right on the left of 
> the 2nd Corps, left on LRT? Geary's men - really only two of his three 
> brigades - in fact covered a good deal of ground, including elements at LRT, 
> with skirmishers out, but it's really beside the point whether he was in a 
> "defensive position" or not, no matter how much Sickles quibbled over the 
> issue. Massed or not, Geary's men still were where they were. 
> 
> Saying Hunt thought highly of Sickles' proposed line isn't exactly accurate. 
> Hunt's opinion of it was, in fact, very qualified. Hunt wrote, comparing 
> the 3rd Corps' assigned line along the ridge, and Sickles' advanced line, 
> "...the choice between them would depend on circumstances. The direct 
> shoprt line through the woods, and including the Round Tops, could be 
> occupied, intrenched, and made impregnable to a front attack. But, like 
> that of Culp's Hill, it would be a purely defensive one, from which, owing 
> to the nature of the ground and the enemy's commanding position on the 
> ridges at the angle, an advance in force would be impracticable. the 
> salient line proposed by General Sickles, although much longer, afforded 
> excellent positions for our artillery; its occupation would cramp the 
> movements of the enemy, bring us nearer his lines, and afford us facilities 
> for taking the offensive. It was in my judgment tactically the better of 
> the two, provided it was strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the 
> field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive 
> with a prospect of decisive results." 
> 
> Fine so far, and Hunt did think well of the proposed line. But note he has 
> already said that this was "provided it was strongly occupied." And on this 
> point, he went on to say, "But General Meade had not, until the arrival of 
> the Sixth Corps, a sufficient number of troops at his disposal to risk such 
> an extension of his lines; it would have required both the Third and Fifth 
> corps, and left him without any reserve." 
> 
> In other words, the line did have its advantages. But unless and until 
> Meade had enough troops on the field to do so, he could not afford to take 
> up that line. 
> 
> 
> Jim Cameron 
> 
> "It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, 
> but for freedom - and for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with 
> life itself." 
> >From the Declaration of Arbroath. 
> 
> 
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