GDG- If Sickles had stayed put!

[Margaret D. Blough]

>>Exactly my point, so why (when he asked three times) did someone not 
tell him his mistake? There WAS time to do it, but Meade sent others 
unauthorized to make the decision that was needed, and waited in going 
himself until it was to late to make the change.<<

In the days before radio communication, commanding generals used aides to communicate with subordinates.  If all Sickles wanted was clarification, then, whatever their rank, whoever Meade sent should have been sufficient.  Exactly who was Sickles in the overall scheme of things, that the commanding general must tear himself away from whatever else he was doing in a fluid situation to personally hold Sickles' hand?  In any event, according to Pfanz, Sickles had gone over to Meade's HQ and Meade had told him where he wanted him to be, giving him discretion only within those limits. From many accounts, Sickles was fixated on the position he wanted and seemed incapable of comprehending any explanation that conflicted with it.  

According to Pfanz, Hunt, when he visited Sickles' desired position with Sickles, saw among the pros and cons  a particularly large con:  Sickles advancing to it required breaking contact with the Second Corps unless the Second Corps advanced with it.  The Second Corps was in place on Cemetery Ridge, which proved its merits as a position on July 3. Hunt saw major problems unless Spangler Woods was securely in Federal hands, which it was not.  

You seem to argue that everyone was supposed to protect Sickles from himself and that all other considerations before Meade had to be subordinated to assuaging Sickles' anxieties about his position.  Hancock was already in position. If Sickles had any doubt about where Hancock was, then it seems doubtful that he had all that sound a basis for determining that the ER position was superior.

At least Sickles himself rejected any argument that he was confused or didn't understand his orders.  He didn't get authorization to do what he wanted so he did it on his own, leaving the rest of the army to fend for itself. 

Regards,

Margaret

-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: Linda J Guy <lindajguy at embarqmail.com> 

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes: 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Margaret D. Blough wrote: 
> > Esteemed GDG Member Contributes: 
> > 
> > Sickles commanded a corps within an army, not to mention having absolutely no 
> experiencing in commanding an army or in military engineering. He had no more 
> idea of what the conditions on the rest of the line were than he did on what was 
> on the dark side of the moon so he could have no idea how his actions would 
> affect the overall defensive line, 
> Exactly my point, so why (when he asked three times) did someone not 
> tell him his mistake? There WAS time to do it, but Meade sent others 
> unauthorized to make the decision that was needed, and waited in going 
> himself until it was to late to make the change. 
> > Yet, on his own, he decided to take an action that did not only affect his own 
> line but affected the army's position as a whole. I've never seen any evidence 
> that he informed, much less consulted, Hancock, whose flank he was exposing, of 
> his plans. 
> Why was Hancock not watching his flank and inform Sickles or even Meade 
> of that problem sooner? Such as when Sickles first arrived on the field 
> (I'm also sure they knew he arrived late)? Did Sickles even know where 
> Hancock's flank was? I remember reading somewhere the confusion of where 
> the units were he was to join to in the line (he could not find them?). 
> I'm not saying Sickles position was right, but he was only taking ground 
> he felt was the best for his men from prior experience in a similar 
> situation. Not knowing the position of the line as a whole, and asking 
> for that information three times does not put all the blame on him in my 
> honest opinion. As you point out, more experienced generals were 
> present, they could have corrected him sooner and the situation before 
> it became a problem. If there was time for the requests, there was time 
> to correct the position by those more experienced generals higher in 
> command. 
> > Units had to be pulled from the rest of the army to plug up the hole he 
> created, and much relied on extraordinary performance by the artillery in buying 
> time, especially in Bigelow's battery holding action in the Peach Orchard and 
> Freeman McGilvery's improvising an artillery line, for relief to come. 
> > 
> And I commend those units in their fast action, but again, the point is 
> why was the hole was not noticed sooner and corrected. Did not Meade 
> listen to his son or Hunt when they reported back to him? The placement 
> could have been corrected sooner if he had answered Sickles first 
> request properly instead of ignoring him. 
> It also seems to me Sickles realized something was wrong with his 
> position in the first place to ask THREE TIMES if it was correct. This 
> was not a case of purposely taking the wrong position, but not 
> understanding the position of the army as a whole and his place in it. 
> It was Meade's place to correct the problem and he did not. 
> 
> Regards, 
> Linda 
> 
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