GDG- If Sickles had stayed put!

[Alan D. Brunelle]

Tom Ryan wrote:
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> Has anyone drawn up a plausible scenario as to what would have happened on
> July 2 if Sickles had actually been in the position that Meade had
> designated for him?
>
> On a number of tours, LBG's have argued that it would have been better for
> the AoP had Sickles been back on CR and LRT.  However, standing in that
> position and looking out toward the ER, it is not that easy to see the
> benefits over Sickles position in the Peach Orchard.
>
> While the Third Corps would have suffered fewer casualties and could have
> caused considerable casualties by firing into the flank of Longstreet's
> corps as it moved up the Er, it still looks as if a good portion of the ANV
> troops would have been free to pounce on the flank of the Second Corps and
> roll it up towards Cemetery Hill.
>
> What are the arguments that it actually would have been better for Sickles
> to have been back on CR/LRT?
>
> Tom Ryan

Hi Tom (again) -

Back to the original question, let's think about another scenario. Meade 
expected Sickles to connect with Hancock's left, and proceed towards 
Little Round Top & occupy that if practicable. I believe Sickles did not 
have enough troops to man a line that extended from Hancock's left /and/ 
still occupy all of the LRT area strongly. Nonetheless, Sickles 
certainly would have been expected to post /some/ force on top of LRT - 
if for no other reasons due to its commanding view & being on his flank.

In addition, one would have expected a reasonable skirmishing force out 
front - out at least as far as Houck's ridge, and probably out as far as 
the Emmitsburg road. In any event, Longstreet would have been aware of 
the layout of significant Union forces due to sighting the skirmishers & 
perhaps parts of Sickles line as well.

I would hope that at least this far we're all in consensus. :-)

The first attempt at this point is to try and construct an assault using 
Lee's original orders (which Lee issued based upon incorrect/incomplete 
intelligence). The current bulk of the mail on this topic has been 
geared towards the notion of getting some sort of screen up to the east 
- to hold back Sickles 3rd Corps from Longstreet's flank/rear. Then take 
the remainder of his corps, augmented by Hill's/Anderson's boys, and try 
to get at the 2nd Corps position - and push through to Cemetery Hill.

Another attempt to crack this nut might be: Longstreet calls Lee over, 
describes the significantly changed Union dispositions, and the two 
construct some other sort of assault. In the "real" battle, Lee's 
original orders were most certainly "tweaked" given the different 
situation encountered (in particular, significant troop to the south & 
east of where Lee thought the Union line ended). I would think that this 
scenario is more logical - I just don't see Lee trying to force through 
a plan that was obviously ill-equipped to meet the demands of the new 
situation.

What options would Lee & Longstreet have to continue that attack? One 
must assume that Lee would /not/ change his notion of pushing the 
initiative - there is nothing to show that Lee had any other desire on 
either Day 2 or Day 3. The two that immediately come to my mind are:

1. Try to outflank the new Union position - try to get around Big Round 
Top (as Hood would have liked in the real scenario). Lee /may/ have 
countenanced such a maneuver - Longstreet was loathe to do so given his 
prickly attitude on Day 2, but with Lee more involved in the situation 
it /may/ have been an option to try. Given the real Day 2 situation, and 
analysis presented concerning the general rationale against such a move 
- including things like: lack of calvary to screen, lack of knowledge 
about where Union forces actually were, the excessive length of the 
resulting Confederate lines, lateness in the day, &c. - it may be 
reasonable to rule this out as a primary target.

2. Try a frontal assault on the 3rd Corps lines - get McLaws & Hoods 
forces parallel to the Emmitsburg Road and assault eastwards towards the 
Union 3rd Corps. One could imagine pushing back Union skirmish lines to 
a line extending northwards starting @ Houck's ridge, and then trying to 
assemble an assault force consisting of Longstreet's 2 divisions. The 
terrain certainly is against such a plan - besides the features west of 
Houck's ridge, one would then have to go down into Plum Run valley and 
up again. An interesting facet of this would be just where the Union 
troops would place artillery pieces along its line. I don't think you 
end up with the broad open plains to fire upon as with the area under 
assault on Day 3. (And I would think - but don't know - that the 
significant artillery up on Cemetery Hill would not be able to reach 
forces this far south?)

I just don't know about this one - it's a long ways from Seminary ridge 
to the jump-off point. Lee /may/ have also been very concerned about the 
perceived strength at Little Round Top as an anchor to the Union left.

If nothing else, Sickles being back along the Cemetery Ridge/LRT line 
would have presented Lee/Longstreet with a very different situation than 
what they ended up with: One could argue that with Sickles main line 
anchored at the Emmitsburg/Millerstown crossroad and heading north - 
with 2 brigades at the Stony Hill & Houck's ridge guarding his flank - 
that the situation the Confederates faced on Day 2 was pretty much what 
Lee expected: The Union line ending at the Peach Orchard, and thence 
northwards along the Emmitsburg Road towards Cemetery Hill.

Respectfully submitted,
Alan