GDG- Pipe Creek

[jack]

Greetings.

I agree that it is absolutley correct that Lee was stopped where he was by 
Meade's forward movement. Meades movement effectively placed the AoP left 
wing in the middle of the inside arc of the Cumberland valley from Maryland 
to East past Harrisburg. Everything on the valley side of the mountains was 
Lee's to have. If the AoP had established Meade's Pipe Creek line, Lee could 
have continued unfettered.
I have to disagree on any movement by Lee that carried the ANV deeper than a 
day's March towards to coast. The ANV was an army in mortal peril since it 
had come up from the Shennendoah. There was no refuge for it other than the 
valley, and the farther up the valley it went, the more danger it was in of 
being cot off (which was Hookers strategy, by the way).

The point is, if Lee had come up that valley and Lee had to go back down 
that valley. Once the battle was forced at Gettysburg, Lee had to throw it 
all or leave. In any event, there was never any chance of Lee maneuvering as 
is often suggested, not much pastb the mountains and certainly not into the 
Cheaspeake littorals.  He was trapped if he got out of range of the valley 
and he was trapped if the AoP had blocked the valley to his rear.

Any theory of Lee bypassing Gettysburg and heading for a coastal city is, I 
believe, unrealistic.

He was simply suiciding his army to do so.

Regards,


Jack
From: <elcarto at comcast.net>
To: "Gettysburg Discussion Grp" <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2008 8:16 AM
Subject: GDG- Pipe Creek


> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
>
>
>>>But I don't see Lee hitting Meade against the Pipe Creek line in enemy
> territory.  The line is too strong and Lee has to know he can't overcome 
> such a
> line against Meade even if he thinks his army is invincible.  If Meade 
> falls
> back, Lee is able to gain the initiative and make Meade move to Lee's 
> wishes.
> If Meade falls back, Lee is able to rove again in enemy territory and Lee 
> knows
> Washington won't allow that.   -  Andy
>
> Just by moving forward as he did Meade stopped Lee from 'roving' ; it was 
> the knowledge that the AoP was simply north of the Potomac that forced Lee 
> to order the sudden concentration of his own army east of South Mountain 
> (to keep the AOP east as well, and protect his own LOC down and up the 
> Valley.)  But in doing so, he had to curtail his 'raid' and face battle.
>
> I believe that Lee pretty well spelled out his overall intentions in that 
> famous quote to Trimble, when he said that he wanted to force the AoP to 
> wear and stretch itself out in marching after him, and then, by rapid 
> movement and maneuver, concentrate his own army and destroy the AoP piece 
> by piece as it moved towards him.  And I certainly think that was his 
> intention when he ordered that Concentration on the night of the 28th.  He 
> knew that the AoP have moved forward faster than he (and everyone else 
> wearing gray) had allowed for, but I still don't think that he had any 
> idea that it was actually as concentrated as it already was when Meade 
> took command.  And so I think hew was still hoping to pounce on whatever 
> part of the AoP he ran into first.
>
> Unfortunately, both his lack of familiarity with the terrain (this wasn't 
> Virginia!) and his lack of knowledge of what was in front of him (no 
> Stuart) combined to rob him of the chance of the sort of maneuvering that 
> led to 2nd Manassas.  I think that battle in particular was the 'model' of 
> what he was trying to achieve in PA, and also gives a hint of what might 
> have happened at Pipe Creek.
>
> Had Meade stopped there, he had a very good defensive line covering all 
> the major roads leading to Baltimore and Washington, but covering about 20 
> miles from Middletown on the west to Manchester in the east.  I agree that 
> Lee wouldn't have just attacked it directly - it IS 'good ground'.  And I 
> don't think he would have maneuvered to the east, as the defensive ground 
> just gets better the further east you go, and Lee's LOC just gets longer 
> and more precarious.
>
> But Meade's line doesn't cover the main road from Gettysburg down to 
> Frederick, and I think that would have been Lee's best chance to achieve 
> his goal.  My guess is that he might have tried some sort of feint against 
> Reynolds from the north while maneuvering the rest of the ANV around to 
> the west and south, in an attempt to envelop the left wing of the AOP 
> before Meade could get the rest of the troops there.  That's the scenario 
> that I envisioned in designing my Pipe Creek maps for our games.
>
> The problem for Lee is that in trying to take up a position on good ground 
> and then hoping that the AOP would willingly hand him another 
> Fredericksburg, it also requires handing the initiative over to his 
> opponent (and if there's any general who hated to do that, it was Lee!) 
> He was able to beat both McClellan and Hooker, against worse odds than at 
> Gettysburg, precisely because he grabbed the initiative and never gave it 
> back; never gave his opponent the chance to catch his breath, as it were. 
> I think that explains Lee's actual actions at Gettysburg, and shows what 
> he might have tried had the situation been slightly different.
>
> Rick Barber
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