GDG- Pipe Creek

[The Mills]

Rick:

Good points.  My only thought though is:  had the commanders who were in
command at Gettysburg been in command at Chancellorsville, would Lee have
been able to do what he had done?  But then again, when we get to Mine Run
later in 1863, we see Lee almost pull off something like that against Meade
and again in 1864 at the North Anna against Grant, so then I am not so sure
he couldn't have pull off the occasional trap.  But the big thing is:  he
didn't do it, so maybe that is the difference, the commanders knew the
difference and it was THE difference, the commanders.  

Thanks
Andy

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com [mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]
On Behalf Of elcarto at comcast.net
Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2008 9:17 AM
To: Gettysburg Discussion Grp
Subject: GDG- Pipe Creek

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:




>>But I don't see Lee hitting Meade against the Pipe Creek line in enemy 
territory.  The line is too strong and Lee has to know he can't overcome
such a 
line against Meade even if he thinks his army is invincible.  If Meade falls

back, Lee is able to gain the initiative and make Meade move to Lee's
wishes.  
If Meade falls back, Lee is able to rove again in enemy territory and Lee
knows 
Washington won't allow that.   -  Andy

Just by moving forward as he did Meade stopped Lee from 'roving' ; it was
the knowledge that the AoP was simply north of the Potomac that forced Lee
to order the sudden concentration of his own army east of South Mountain (to
keep the AOP east as well, and protect his own LOC down and up the Valley.)
But in doing so, he had to curtail his 'raid' and face battle.

I believe that Lee pretty well spelled out his overall intentions in that
famous quote to Trimble, when he said that he wanted to force the AoP to
wear and stretch itself out in marching after him, and then, by rapid
movement and maneuver, concentrate his own army and destroy the AoP piece by
piece as it moved towards him.  And I certainly think that was his intention
when he ordered that Concentration on the night of the 28th.  He knew that
the AoP have moved forward faster than he (and everyone else wearing gray)
had allowed for, but I still don't think that he had any idea that it was
actually as concentrated as it already was when Meade took command.  And so
I think hew was still hoping to pounce on whatever part of the AoP he ran
into first.

Unfortunately, both his lack of familiarity with the terrain (this wasn't
Virginia!) and his lack of knowledge of what was in front of him (no Stuart)
combined to rob him of the chance of the sort of maneuvering that led to 2nd
Manassas.  I think that battle in particular was the 'model' of what he was
trying to achieve in PA, and also gives a hint of what might have happened
at Pipe Creek.

Had Meade stopped there, he had a very good defensive line covering all the
major roads leading to Baltimore and Washington, but covering about 20 miles
from Middletown on the west to Manchester in the east.  I agree that Lee
wouldn't have just attacked it directly - it IS 'good ground'.  And I don't
think he would have maneuvered to the east, as the defensive ground just
gets better the further east you go, and Lee's LOC just gets longer and more
precarious.  

But Meade's line doesn't cover the main road from Gettysburg down to
Frederick, and I think that would have been Lee's best chance to achieve his
goal.  My guess is that he might have tried some sort of feint against
Reynolds from the north while maneuvering the rest of the ANV around to the
west and south, in an attempt to envelop the left wing of the AOP before
Meade could get the rest of the troops there.  That's the scenario that I
envisioned in designing my Pipe Creek maps for our games.

The problem for Lee is that in trying to take up a position on good ground
and then hoping that the AOP would willingly hand him another
Fredericksburg, it also requires handing the initiative over to his opponent
(and if there's any general who hated to do that, it was Lee!)   He was able
to beat both McClellan and Hooker, against worse odds than at Gettysburg,
precisely because he grabbed the initiative and never gave it back; never
gave his opponent the chance to catch his breath, as it were.  I think that
explains Lee's actual actions at Gettysburg, and shows what he might have
tried had the situation been slightly different.

Rick Barber
 
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