GDG- Lee's Options

[elcarto at comcast.net]

>>You've hit on what seems to be an intriguing point, that Lee had no real 
operational plan which included contingencies. Taking into account his post war 
interviews it seems that Lee's primary objective was to raid into Pennsylvania 
and thus remove the Union troops and pressure from northern Virginia. For the 
ANV GB represents a failure in thinking as well as one in execution. After day 
two, Lee's available options still included striking North to threaten 
Philadelphia or South to interpose his army between the AoP and Washinton. In 
either option he could have expected to fight a defensive action as Meade would 
have been compelled by the political situation to attack -  Dick

Unfortunately, by the end of July 2nd, Lee was left with only three options - Attack Meade where he was, pull back Ewell to Seminary Ridge and hope that Meade would attack HIM (which he did on July 4th), or else disengage and return South. By concentrating his army to give battle Lee had lost his operational maneuverability, and to disengage and try to somehow get between Meade and Washington was simply beyond his army at that point; mainly because so many of his best officers and troops were now a wounded liability instead of being in the assets column.

He certainly couldn't return to living off the land by scattering his troops all over the landscape, as had happened in the previous weeks, not with an aggressive and numerous enemy concentrated in his front (and he still didn't know at that point whether or not he was facing the entire AoP, and where the rest might show up if he wasn't.

Rick Barber