GDG- Re Signal station on LRT on July 2

[Michael Davidson]

Jim,

I watched Troy Harman's battle walk on TV.  Thank you for recalling it.  It seems to me that several recent posts on various aspects of Day 2 point the same way.  You are correct that he discussed that the signalers on LRT spotted Longstreet's countermarch.  He maintained, I believe, that the message was sent to Meade to expect a flanking attack on his right, which, IIRC, impelled Meade to send a cavalry probe in force against Ewell's eastern flank and rear, which in turn caused Ewell, in absence of cavalry, to commit two brigades -- including, I think he said, the Stonewall Brigade -- to screen his left, thus depriving his attack on the heights to his front of substantial strength.  I hope I am recalling his (TH's) points correctly, because it was fascinating, (this is my interpretation, now) how a misapprehension on the Union left caused mistaken action on the right to disrupt it, which in turn hurt Ewell's ability to coordinate with Longstreet, and this was caused
 ultimately by the countermarch, which delayed the attack on the Union left.  The over-commitment of cavalry to the Union right may explain why no one seemed concerned with the absence of cavalry on the Union left, at that time.  And the cavalry probe which expected to find Confederates massing behind Ewell did find some, but they were Second Corps, not First Corps.  Longstreet's troops were massing on the neglected Union left, where there was no cavalry, Buford having been sent away and not replaced.  That left Sickles to try improvising a screen with Berdan's Sharpshooters.  So the question arises, who ordered that the First Corps move into position by a route unseen from LRT, which ultimately resulted in the countermarch, leading to this can of worms?  Anyway, this is my take on where these various discussions seem to point.

As to whether an earlier march straight to the ordered jumping-off point would have been better or worse for the ANV,  I'm not sure.   Much of the confusion an earlier attack might have exploited seems to have been caused by the countermarch itself, and the attack would still have been surprised and disrupted by Sickles' advanced position, which absent the countermarch might have had a decent amount of cavalry on its left flank.  OTOH, absent the countermarch, Ewell could have maintained full strength and position to assist.  And, to throw more fuel on the fire, let me quote Longstreet's take on the situation in "From Manassas to Appomattox" (Ch 27c):

"At the opening of the fight, General Meade was with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the Third Corps back to the line originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the Confederate battle. If that opening had been delayed thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back to the general line, and my first deployment would have enveloped Little Round Top and carried it before it could have been strongly manned, and General Meade would have drawn off to his line selected behind Pipe Creek. The point should have been that the battle was opened too soon."

I'm not going to argue his LRT reference, but his assignment was, I believe, to drive the Union left toward the center, and I think he means he believed he could do it.

Please don't blame the ranger if I misunderstood any of his points or mixed them up with my own.

Regards,

Michael Davidson

>>
Esteemed member wrote:
We just enjoyed a battle walk with Park Ranger Troy Harman which covered some of the ground of the countermarch. In Troy's opinion, Meade was expecting an attack on his right on July 2, and the sighting of the countermarch by the signal station on LRT confirmed his suspicions in his mind. If southbound troops were seen by the signal station, the ASOP would IMO have had sufficient time to react and meet the attack with a stronger defense IF (a big one) the attack took place as it ultimately did. If the two divisions had marched straight to their ordered jumping-off point, with McLaws leading and Hood in support, they may have been able to deliver a crushing blow earlier than 4 P.M. Intewresting thoughts.
JC
----- Original Message -----
From: Alan D. Brunelle <Alan.Brunelle at pobox.com>
To: GDG <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Thu, 24 Jul 2008 16:33:40 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: GDG- Signal station on LRT on July 2

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Tom Ryan wrote:
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
> Given the lateness of the afternoon already, an argument could be made that
> Longstreet should have ignored the signal station and continued his march to
> get into position some two hours earlier than the eventual 4 p.m. or so
> launch time -- despite the fact that the Union army would have been alerted
> to his movements.  That one seems to be a close call, however.
>
> Tom Ryan

Hi Tom -

IIRC there was a message sent from LRT stating that they saw ANV troops 
heading /north/ (the counter march) - I don't know if that ever reached 
Meade. If it did, it would have reinforced the in his mind the notion 
that the battle would take place on his right, not his left.

If Longstreet had not counter marched, and a message from LRT reached 
Meade (in a timely manner) indicating a large body of troops heading 
/south/ then I would think Meade would have been much more involved on 
the Sickles front earlier - and most likely dragging Sickles & his men 
back to where they belonged...

Alan
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