GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Wed Jul 23 13:44:08 CDT 2008

Hi Rick,

Indeed Hooker did send a similar message to Pleasonton.  It was dated June
17 and read:

"The commanding general relies upon you with your cavalry force to give him
information of where the enemy is, his force, and his movements.  You have a
sufficient cavalry force to do this.  Drive in pickets, if necessary, and
get us information.  It is better that we should lose men than to be without
knowledge of the enemy, as we now seem to be."

This message came from Hooker to Pleasonton soon after Pleasonton had
allowed Ewell's corps to march from Culpeper to the Shenandoah Valley
unobserved by Union cavalry, and, as a result, the outpost at Winchester
fell after Ewell's attack with the loss of four to five thousand men.

Perhaps even more serious, however, was the fact that Pleasonton refused to
cooperate with the BMI intelligence team that had been assigned to his
corps, and did not permit them freedom of movement or access to prisoners
for interrogation.  McEntee had complained of this to Colonel Sharpe in a
private message.  As a result, Hooker added to the above message the
following passage:

"Captain McEntee, of Colonel Sharpe's department, thoroughly understands the
whole organization of the rebel army, and is sent out to join you [actually
he was already there].  After you have examined any prisoners, deserters, or
contrabands brought in, the gneral desires you will give him a chance to
examine all of them, and desires that all information may be ocmmuincated
with great promptness, and directs that you leave nothing undone to give him
the fullest information."

Despite this detailed set of instructions, Pleasonton continued to conduct
combat operations rather than focusing on gathering information about the
location and movements of Lee's army.  I suppose Meade must have gotten wind
of this shortcoming when he took over for Hooker; therefore, he sent the
message quoted earlier from Meade to Pleasonton.

The message that you quote, Rick, from Meade to Halleck I believe
demonstrates one of Meade's weaknesses.  That is, a lack of good judgment in
key situations.  The only reason I can surmise that Meade did this is that
Pleasonton must have somehow convinced him that he deserved recognition for
his performance during the campaign.  Meade kept Pleasonton close at hand at
all times, so Pleasonton may have been a good enough salesman to pull the
wool over Meade's eyes.

The blunder of sending Buford's brigades off to Taneytown without
replacements being available should have been sufficient evidence to Meade
that Pleasonton was not up to the job of corps commander for the Army of the
Potomac.

Tom Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Richard & Sue Ann
Schaus
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2008 10:41 PM
To: 'GDG'
Subject: RE: GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

Hi,

I believe Hooker sent a similar note to Pleasonton earlier in the
campaign.

And yet, on 10 July, Meade sent the following message to Halleck:

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck:
  In consequence of the very efficient service and the material aid
rendered to me by the cavalry during my recent operations, I would
esteem it a personal favor if the President would assign Major-General
Pleasonton to the command of the Cavalry Corps, the position I found him
in when I assumed command.
GEO. G. MEADE
Major-General, Commanding."

(OR, Pt I, pp 90)

VR, Rick Schaus

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com] On Behalf Of James Cameron
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2008 6:13 PM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

<<What sums Pleasonton up, to me, is that Meade saw fit to have Seth
Williams
send him the following, almost astounding, message on June 30.  I say
"almost astounding" because it's difficult to even imagine the commander
of
the army's cavalry corps having to have this spelled out for him not
only in
the middle of a campaign, but literally on the eve of battle.

     "The major-general commanding directs me to say that it is of the
utmost importance to him that he receives reliable information of the
presence of the enemy, his forces, and his movements.  His projected
movement is toward the line of the Baltimore and Harrisburg road.  His
instruxctions require him to cover Baltimore and Washington, while his
objective point is the army under Lee.  To be able to find if this army
is
divided, and to concentrate upon any detached portion of it, without
departing from the instrructions which govern him, would be a great
object.
People in the country are so freightened that he must depend solely upon
the
cavalry for all the information he can gain.  He looks to you to keep
him
informed of their movements, and especially that no force concentrates
on
his right, in the vicinity of York, to get between him and the
Susquehanna,
and also that no force moves on his left toward hagerstown and the
passes
below Cashtown.  Your cavalry force is large, and must be vigilent and
active.  The reports must be those gained by the cavalry themselves, and
the
information sent in should be reliable.
       The duty you have to perform is of a most important and sacred
character.  Cavalry battles must be secondary to this object.  the
general
does not understand why General Gregg (whose orders required him to move

parallel with, and on the left flank of, the Sixth Corps, and forming
the
right wing of the army in the present movement) should have moved on the

same line with that command"

This is something you'd tell a new 2nd LT his first day on the job, if
you
had some doubts about how well he'd been trained.  And the part about
cavalry battles being secondary to gathering information points out part
of
the problem.  Pleasonton didn't seem to realize that it he was fighting
enemy cavalry, that meant THEY were screening HIM.

Jim Cameron>>

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