GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

[Richard & Sue Ann Schaus]

Hi,

I believe Hooker sent a similar note to Pleasonton earlier in the
campaign. 

And yet, on 10 July, Meade sent the following message to Halleck:

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck:
  In consequence of the very efficient service and the material aid
rendered to me by the cavalry during my recent operations, I would
esteem it a personal favor if the President would assign Major-General
Pleasonton to the command of the Cavalry Corps, the position I found him
in when I assumed command.
GEO. G. MEADE
Major-General, Commanding."

(OR, Pt I, pp 90)

VR, Rick Schaus


-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com] On Behalf Of James Cameron
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2008 6:13 PM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:



<<What sums Pleasonton up, to me, is that Meade saw fit to have Seth
Williams 
send him the following, almost astounding, message on June 30.  I say 
"almost astounding" because it's difficult to even imagine the commander
of 
the army's cavalry corps having to have this spelled out for him not
only in 
the middle of a campaign, but literally on the eve of battle.

     "The major-general commanding directs me to say that it is of the 
utmost importance to him that he receives reliable information of the 
presence of the enemy, his forces, and his movements.  His projected 
movement is toward the line of the Baltimore and Harrisburg road.  His 
instruxctions require him to cover Baltimore and Washington, while his 
objective point is the army under Lee.  To be able to find if this army
is 
divided, and to concentrate upon any detached portion of it, without 
departing from the instrructions which govern him, would be a great
object. 
People in the country are so freightened that he must depend solely upon
the 
cavalry for all the information he can gain.  He looks to you to keep
him 
informed of their movements, and especially that no force concentrates
on 
his right, in the vicinity of York, to get between him and the
Susquehanna, 
and also that no force moves on his left toward hagerstown and the
passes 
below Cashtown.  Your cavalry force is large, and must be vigilent and 
active.  The reports must be those gained by the cavalry themselves, and
the 
information sent in should be reliable.
       The duty you have to perform is of a most important and sacred 
character.  Cavalry battles must be secondary to this object.  the
general 
does not understand why General Gregg (whose orders required him to move

parallel with, and on the left flank of, the Sixth Corps, and forming
the 
right wing of the army in the present movement) should have moved on the

same line with that command"

This is something you'd tell a new 2nd LT his first day on the job, if
you 
had some doubts about how well he'd been trained.  And the part about 
cavalry battles being secondary to gathering information points out part
of 
the problem.  Pleasonton didn't seem to realize that it he was fighting 
enemy cavalry, that meant THEY were screening HIM.

Jim Cameron>>


 
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