GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Tue Jul 22 08:24:22 CDT 2008

Tom,

I agree with everything you've said here.  Pleasonton's failures were  
egregious.  There's no doubt about it.

Eric

On Jul 22, 2008, at 9:16 AM, Tom Ryan wrote:

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> Hi Eric,
>
> Thanks for your help on this subject.  It turns out I had read your  
> article
> last year when it came out and heavily highlighted various portions  
> (as a
> matter of fact, I always read your articles first because of my  
> interest in
> cavalry actions).  However, beacuse of a combination of reading so  
> much
> other material since that time plus the fact that at this stage of  
> my life
> mental retention is problematic (what did I have for breakfast  
> yesterday?),
> and unfortunately it is difficult to retain and recall much of what  
> I read.
>
> That said, when I went back and checked your article I readlized  
> that the
> 4th PA's involvement in this episode did not particularly attract my
> attention at the time I had first read it.  In writing a chapter in  
> my book
> on intelligence operations, however, the mention of the 4th PA's  
> assignment
> surfaced in a variety of material I was dealing with -- ergo the  
> question.
>
> The bottom line appears to be that this regiment was too little too  
> late as
> you said to fill the gap left by Buford's departure, and the damage of
> Pleasonton's mindless action was not to be repaired.  Pleasonton  
> handling of
> this critical situation is reminiscent of his repeated prior command
> failures during the campaign.  Just to name a few of these failures:
>
> Did not leave a cavalry picket behind at the Rappahannock River to  
> maintain
> watch over the portion of Lee's army that remained there after  
> Hooker moved
> the AoP northward.
>
> Did not obtain information about the movement of the ANV down the  
> Shenandoah
> Valley at the time of the cavalry clashes in Loudoun Valley (June  
> 17-21).
>
> Did not send a cavalry contingent to check out Stuart's reported  
> brush with
> Hancock's corps on June 25.
>
> Did not check out Stuart's reported presence at Westminster on June  
> 29 (he
> thought the people there had mistaken Union cavalry for Rebel  
> cavalry).
>
> All this plus the fact that the quality of his intelligence  
> gathering was
> notoriously poor, and the information he provided generally  
> unreliable.
>
> Given that history during the campaign, the Buford blunder was in  
> keeping
> with his prior performance.
>
> Thanks again for clarifying the 4th PA Cav's involvement.  That  
> pretty much
> clarifies tha fact that the work of screening Sickles' front and  
> flank was
> left to the USSS and other infantry units rather than Union cavalry.
>
> Regards, Tom
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
> [mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Eric J. Wittenberg
> Sent: Monday, July 21, 2008 3:08 PM
> To: GDG
> Subject: Re: GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2
>
>
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> Tom,
>
> Have you read my article on this very topic that was in issue 37 of
> Gettysburg Magazine?  My research indicated that the 4th PA did not
> arrive until just before Longstreet launched his assault, which would
> be sometime between 3 and 4 in the afternoon.  By then, it was far too
> little, far too late.
>
> Here's what I wrote: "Gregg sent the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry.  Its
> numbers were insufficient to cover the entire flank, and it is unclear
> when these men arrived in the area.  The Pennsylvania horse soldiers
> had come to Gettysburg by way of Hanover after an all-night march, and
> they were exhausted.  By the time they arrived, it was too little, too
> late, as Longstreet was about to unleash his sledgehammer blow on the
> Army of the Potomac's left flank.  It is unclear where the
> responsibility for the failure to replace Buford's departing troopers
> lies, but it ultimately must fall upon the Cavalry Corps commander,
> Pleasonton, for failing to recognize the need to protect the army's
> position with a cavalry screen.  The Union left flank was left
> unprotected, leaving it open to the attack that would come that
> afternoon."
>
> This paragraph appears on p. 71.
>
> As for the assignment, the 4th PA was supposed to provide screening
> for the left flank of the AoP position.  Butterfield's note to
> Pleasonton of 12:50 states: "the patrols and pickets upon the
> Emmitsburg road must be kept on as long as our troops are in
> position."  OR 27, pt. 3, 490.  A few minutes later, Butterfield
> wrote, "[Meade] expected, when Buford's force was sent to Westminster,
> that a force should be sent to replace it, picketing and patrolling
> the Emmitsburg road."  Ibid.  From these two dispatches, it's clear
> that the 4th was supposed to perform the same duties that Gamble's
> brigade had been performing before it was pulled out.
>
> Eric
>
> On Jul 21, 2008, at 2:53 PM, Tom Ryan wrote:
>
>> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>>
>>
>> In reexamining the issue of cavalry commander Pleasonton ordering
>> Buford's
>> two brigades to Taneytown from the Union left flank on July 2  
>> (thereby
>> uncovering that flank), it seems that Pleasonton made a rather feeble
>> attempt to make up for this blunder by directing Gregg to send a
>> regiment
>> from his cavalry division to cover the left in place of Buford.  The
>> 4th PA
>> received this assignment.  The messages related to this situation
>> are in OR,
>> vol. 27, partIII, page 490).
>>
>> In reading Longacre's account of this episode in "The Cavalry at
>> Gettysburg"
>> (page 207), it is unclear whether the 4th PA Cav arrived before,
>> during or
>> after Longstreet's attack on Sickles' salient position in the late
>> afternoon
>> of July 2.
>>
>> I rather think that this cav regiment did not arrive prior to the
>> attack
>> because the 2nd US Sharpshooters of Berdan's brigade had the
>> assignment of
>> covering Sickles left flank prior to the attack.
>>
>> Longacre's comments are that the 4th PA Cav "attempted to take the
>> place of
>> Gamble's and Devin's men on the left of the Union line.  [Col.
>> Doster] and
>> his men spent the balance of the day supporting batteries above
>> Little Round
>> Top and giving Sickle's troops a covering fire against Rebels
>> overrunning
>> their salient."  That is a little vague, and I cannot quite tell
>> from this
>> whether the 4th PA was on hand at the outset of the fighting.  If
>> they were,
>> it is reasonable to assume they would have been working in
>> conjunction with
>> the 2nd USSS in providing cover for that flank.
>>
>> Does anyone have any info on when the 4th PA Cav arrived on the
>> scene on the
>> Union left, and what there initial assignment was?
>>
>> Tom Ryan
>>
>>
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