GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Tue Jul 22 08:16:17 CDT 2008

Hi Eric,

Thanks for your help on this subject.  It turns out I had read your article
last year when it came out and heavily highlighted various portions (as a
matter of fact, I always read your articles first because of my interest in
cavalry actions).  However, beacuse of a combination of reading so much
other material since that time plus the fact that at this stage of my life
mental retention is problematic (what did I have for breakfast yesterday?),
and unfortunately it is difficult to retain and recall much of what I read.

That said, when I went back and checked your article I readlized that the
4th PA's involvement in this episode did not particularly attract my
attention at the time I had first read it.  In writing a chapter in my book
on intelligence operations, however, the mention of the 4th PA's assignment
surfaced in a variety of material I was dealing with -- ergo the question.

The bottom line appears to be that this regiment was too little too late as
you said to fill the gap left by Buford's departure, and the damage of
Pleasonton's mindless action was not to be repaired.  Pleasonton handling of
this critical situation is reminiscent of his repeated prior command
failures during the campaign.  Just to name a few of these failures:

Did not leave a cavalry picket behind at the Rappahannock River to maintain
watch over the portion of Lee's army that remained there after Hooker moved
the AoP northward.

Did not obtain information about the movement of the ANV down the Shenandoah
Valley at the time of the cavalry clashes in Loudoun Valley (June 17-21).

Did not send a cavalry contingent to check out Stuart's reported brush with
Hancock's corps on June 25.

Did not check out Stuart's reported presence at Westminster on June 29 (he
thought the people there had mistaken Union cavalry for Rebel cavalry).

All this plus the fact that the quality of his intelligence gathering was
notoriously poor, and the information he provided generally unreliable.

Given that history during the campaign, the Buford blunder was in keeping
with his prior performance.

Thanks again for clarifying the 4th PA Cav's involvement.  That pretty much
clarifies tha fact that the work of screening Sickles' front and flank was
left to the USSS and other infantry units rather than Union cavalry.

Regards, Tom

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Eric J. Wittenberg
Sent: Monday, July 21, 2008 3:08 PM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- 4th PA Cav on July 2

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

Tom,

Have you read my article on this very topic that was in issue 37 of
Gettysburg Magazine?  My research indicated that the 4th PA did not
arrive until just before Longstreet launched his assault, which would
be sometime between 3 and 4 in the afternoon.  By then, it was far too
little, far too late.

Here's what I wrote: "Gregg sent the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry.  Its
numbers were insufficient to cover the entire flank, and it is unclear
when these men arrived in the area.  The Pennsylvania horse soldiers
had come to Gettysburg by way of Hanover after an all-night march, and
they were exhausted.  By the time they arrived, it was too little, too
late, as Longstreet was about to unleash his sledgehammer blow on the
Army of the Potomac's left flank.  It is unclear where the
responsibility for the failure to replace Buford's departing troopers
lies, but it ultimately must fall upon the Cavalry Corps commander,
Pleasonton, for failing to recognize the need to protect the army's
position with a cavalry screen.  The Union left flank was left
unprotected, leaving it open to the attack that would come that
afternoon."

This paragraph appears on p. 71.

As for the assignment, the 4th PA was supposed to provide screening
for the left flank of the AoP position.  Butterfield's note to
Pleasonton of 12:50 states: "the patrols and pickets upon the
Emmitsburg road must be kept on as long as our troops are in
position."  OR 27, pt. 3, 490.  A few minutes later, Butterfield
wrote, "[Meade] expected, when Buford's force was sent to Westminster,
that a force should be sent to replace it, picketing and patrolling
the Emmitsburg road."  Ibid.  From these two dispatches, it's clear
that the 4th was supposed to perform the same duties that Gamble's
brigade had been performing before it was pulled out.

Eric

On Jul 21, 2008, at 2:53 PM, Tom Ryan wrote:

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> In reexamining the issue of cavalry commander Pleasonton ordering
> Buford's
> two brigades to Taneytown from the Union left flank on July 2 (thereby
> uncovering that flank), it seems that Pleasonton made a rather feeble
> attempt to make up for this blunder by directing Gregg to send a
> regiment
> from his cavalry division to cover the left in place of Buford.  The
> 4th PA
> received this assignment.  The messages related to this situation
> are in OR,
> vol. 27, partIII, page 490).
>
> In reading Longacre's account of this episode in "The Cavalry at
> Gettysburg"
> (page 207), it is unclear whether the 4th PA Cav arrived before,
> during or
> after Longstreet's attack on Sickles' salient position in the late
> afternoon
> of July 2.
>
> I rather think that this cav regiment did not arrive prior to the
> attack
> because the 2nd US Sharpshooters of Berdan's brigade had the
> assignment of
> covering Sickles left flank prior to the attack.
>
> Longacre's comments are that the 4th PA Cav "attempted to take the
> place of
> Gamble's and Devin's men on the left of the Union line.  [Col.
> Doster] and
> his men spent the balance of the day supporting batteries above
> Little Round
> Top and giving Sickle's troops a covering fire against Rebels
> overrunning
> their salient."  That is a little vague, and I cannot quite tell
> from this
> whether the 4th PA was on hand at the outset of the fighting.  If
> they were,
> it is reasonable to assume they would have been working in
> conjunction with
> the 2nd USSS in providing cover for that flank.
>
> Does anyone have any info on when the 4th PA Cav arrived on the
> scene on the
> Union left, and what there initial assignment was?
>
> Tom Ryan
>
>
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