GDG- "jumping to conclusions" regarding the 59th NY at the wal

[Jack Kelly]

Hi Don,

>> ? Jack, I would not be so quick to jump to conclusions regarding the 
>> actions of either the 59th NY or the 69th Pa based on Cowen testimony. 
>> First of all, the reason for Zack's view that the entire four companies 
>> of the 59th NY never occupied the 50 yards to the left of the 69th? Pa? 
>> is not because of "Brown's gate".... in fact there were 30 yards of wall 
>> space directly to the left of the 69th that could have been used by the 
>> 59th... wall space just as high as that used by the ten companies of the 
>> 69th Pa. "Brown's Gate" is located some 30 yards to the south of the end 
>> of the 69th line.? It is the placement of first Brown's guns and then 
>> Cowen's guns that Zack cites as the reason the 59th NY never occupied the 
>> location marked by their regimental right flank marker. My understanding 
>> from taking Zack's tour is that in his view not only is the "right flank 
>> marker" INCORRECTLY placed but that the 59th NY Regimental marker itself 
>> is INCORRECTLY? placed. >>

My opinion would be that the 30 yards of wall space to the left of the 69th 
PA would be insufficient space for the 100+ men of the 59th NY.  Assuming 
18" per man (assuming the regiment was in single rank behind the wall, which 
I am sure it was; not in line-of-battle formation), the required space would 
be nearer 50-60 yards.  I am also reasonably sure that they would not have 
split the regiment with companies on either side of Brown's Gate.  CW units 
did not like to do this, feeling that it destroyed unit cohesion. 
Therefore, I believe that they would have been south of Brown's Gate.  This 
is especially true when the position of Brown's battery (B 1st RI) and later 
Cowan's battery (1st NY Independent) is considered.  No way would an 
experienced CW infantryman hunker down in front of an artillery battery; 
they would move.  They knew the definition of "friendly fire" (i.e., "It 
ain't!").

>> ? Secondly, with regard to the 69th right two companies, the field of 
>> fire of Cowen's single right wing gun would have endangered the left 
>> flank of Company G. In fact, Privates Clay and Coyle in Company G were 
>> killed by Cowen's "friendly fire". Privates Michael and James Laracy also 
>> in Co. G,? suffered head and back shoulder wounds which may be related to 
>> Cowen fire. I agree that Company G was in a very dangerous place and have 
>> no proof that there were not some men pulling back from that location. In 
>> all my research of 69th materials I have yet to find any mention of 
>> Company G men? running back but have found several references to company 
>> K and G refusing their left at this point.?<<

We have discussed this in the past, and I agree with you that there is no 
evidence of either of the two companies running.  However, I'm wondering 
whether some of these guys being worked over by Cowan's guns (especially on 
the left flank of G Company) figured they'd get out of the line of fire 
posthaste, and get into a healthier position behind the guns.  Cowan had one 
of his guns on the north side of the Copse of Trees firing directly over the 
heads of the 69th PA. while the rest of the battery was on the south side of 
the Copse firing over G and K Company.  These five guns would have required 
a considerable area of frontage (at least 30+ yards) which would have been 
dangerous ground for either Union infantry regiments.


 <<As for Cowen's accounts of officers ("a Captain") running while squawking 
like a turkey and men being hit over the head with coffee pots I have always 
noted that when the 69th Pa invited Andrew Cowen to attend the dedication of 
their regimental monument in 1887 he accepted, attended and not only had no 
such tall tales to tell but spoke only in the highest terms about the 
regiment. Only in 1911 (48 years after the battle) do we see the appearances 
of such "hollywood" scenes. It is possible that some men from the 69th did 
"flee" but since Company G had no Captain present and Company K's Captain 
William Davis was the man who took command of the regiment on July 4 and 
rose to Lt. Colonel and since Company B (next in line) had a captain who was 
recovering in Philadelphia at the time, I have always wondered who this 
mysterious "turkey-man" was.>>

This is also a point that has puzzled me.  It may be the ramblings of a 
senior citizen (I have been accused of some of these ramblings as I have 
entered my dotage) who mixes up events of battle A with those of battles B 
and C after 50 years.

Regards,

Jack Kelly