GDG- The Advance of Longstreet's Corps

[Chet Diestel]

 Esteemed GDG Member Tom Ryan Contributes:

 Just finished reading Doug Haines' article in the latest issue of 
Gettysburg Magazine titled "The Advance of Longstreet's First Corps to 
Gettysburg." The article is heavily researched and well presented.  Although 
the title deals with Longstreet, the author manages to cover the advance of 
Lee's entire army from the Rappahannock to Gettysburg.

   What I found particularly interesting is that Haines points out the 
failure of BG Beverly Robertson to follow Stuart's orders to observe and 
report on the movements of the AoP once it started across the Potomac River 
into Maryland.  This aspect of the campaign has not received the attention 
it deserves.  I covered this subject in some detail in Part 4 of my series 
on intelligence operations in Gettysburg Magazine (see Issue 32, pages 
9-11). I called it "Linchpin of a Battle Lost," because Stuart had delegated 
his intelligence gathering and counterintelligence roles to Robertson while 
he carried out Lee's orders to take three brigades and cross into Maryland 
to cover Ewell's right flank, and Robertson was not up to the task.
   Robertson was given the resources to do the job asked of him, including 
one of the best brigades for outpost duty, that being "Grumble" Jones' 
brigade. Yet neither Robertson nor Jones were aware of the AoP moving north 
across the river over a three-day period, and therefore left Lee in the 
lurch regarding the actual location of Hooker's army.  Haines points this 
out, but  he also calls Stuart's assignment of Robertson to this task "his 
most egregious error of the Gettysburg Campaign."  I disagree with Haines' 
assessment, since Stuart likely believed he made the best call under the 
circumstances.  He did not want Robertson along with him on the expedition, 
since he would have been an albatross around his neck.  Also, with Jones' 
crack brigade available to Robertson, Stuart was more comfortable that the 
job assigned would be carried out.

   One other item that I tend to disagree with is the author's highlighting 
Longstreet's not following orders on two occasions during the march.  I am 
also not certain one of them could be labeled not following orders.  These 
were when Lee thought Longstreet was marching west of the Blue Ridge when he 
actually was to the east.  The other was when Longstreet marched into the 
Valley, rather than protecting the gaps.  In this case, he had to send 
McLaws and Hood's divisions back to protect the gaps since Pleasonton's 
cavalry was attacking Stuart.

  Overall, however, this was a great article, and is a good reference piece 
for the future.
           Tom Ryan

  Tom,
  Great observations concerning the article and I agree that the assignment 
of Robertson by Stuart was not "his most egregious error of the Gettysburg 
Campaign," however, I am still left with the overriding question that if 
Stuart didn't trust Robertson's capability as a leader to efficiently carry 
out his duties, and as such did not take him along on "the ride," when he 
would be under the cavalry leader's direct command, why in God's name would 
he believe that the brigade commander would be aggressively alert when left 
on his own?
  Pairing him with the always prickly "Grumble" Jones raises another 
question: Why not Jones instead of Robertson in command? It is true that 
Robertson was senior in grade in the Confederate Army, but Jones was 
Robertson's senior in terms of service, dating back to the Old Army (USMA 
'48 vs. USMA '49) and those things did count among many officers. And while 
it is true that Robertson had seen service with the ANV (Where Stuart's low 
opinion of him as a commander was formed.), while Jones was of The Valley, 
Robertson had been stationed in North Carolina from the fall of 1862 to the 
spring of '63, it would seem that the question of the ANV command structure 
really didn't come into play. Moreover, the "sneak and peak" operations that 
Stuart wanted was exactly what Jones' Brigade had far more experience at 
than Robertson's people.
 Moreover, it doesn't seem that any great pressure was put on Robertson by 
Longstreet or Lee to determine the location of the AOP, both relying, it 
seems, on their belief that Stuart would keep them fully informed and that 
would seem to indicate that neither of the senior comanders fully realized 
that is the charge given to Robertson by Stuart before he rode away in a 
cloud of dust.
   No, it was Stuart's "most egregious error," but it was one of many (by 
him and others) that helped build a firm foundation for disaster.
     With regards,
        Chet