GDG- Role of a division commander once an attack is underway.
Alan D. Brunelle
Alan.Brunelle at pobox.com
Tue Feb 19 18:35:43 CST 2008
I've seen comments on how things /may/ have been different if Hood had
not been injured very early in Longstreet's Day 2 assault. But I'm
wondering: how much control could a division commander have during the
Civil War once his brigades got moving?? As a case for comparative purposes:
o Kershaw in his OR (plus in later writings) is very clear that his
instructions were to cross the Emmitsburg Road, then turn north and
attack in a relatively northerly fashion. [One would expect that his
fellow brigade commanders would have had similar instructions...] He
then goes on to explain how he changed plans based upon the different
scenario he faced - his brigade would now head east, clear out the Stony
Hill area, then proceed northwards.
o After the assault got underway, and a lodgment was established on the
Stony Hill, and then pushed off, and his brigade pushed back near the
Rose Farm, Barksdale & Wofford cleared out the Peach Orchard area, and
(most of) Barksdale's brigade proceeded north - thus, perhaps,
illustrating that Barksdale (at least) was on the same page as Kershaw
with regards to initial instructions.
o At this point - once the Stony Hill & Peach Orchard areas were
cleaned out - one would have expected Kershaw to likewise conform to
Barksdale, and head north.
o But - always a but - Wofford's impetus pushes Kershaw's brigade
eastwards, and Barksdale & Kershaw's directions diverge.
Somewhere in this series of events, wouldn't one expect that McLaw's
would get involved, and straighten things out - either working with
Barksdale to head east or working with Wofford & Kershaw (& perhaps
Semmes) to head northwards? Would this sort of large-scale control be
possible given Civil War command & control limitations? And if not, why
do people think that Hood could have been able to do something with his
spread out brigades?
Regards,
Alan
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