GDG- Artillery of Gettysburg Book

[Richard M Kadas]

In Gottfried's new arty book, does his account of the role of arty at GB go into its antipersonnel effectiveness? This topic is of particular interest to me. As an analyst, I've spent much time delving into the welter of conflicting stats from the ACW dealing with the Arty's antipersonnel effectiveness. Unfortunately much of them seem to be of the post hoc variety. As an example, we are told in the Medical & Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion that only 5.5% of wounds classified at a Union hospital were from Arty and that the other 94.5% came from small arms. Is this data correct or paradoxical in that it only reflects as to those left alive to be admitted to a hospital. It doesn't account for the KIAs and DOWs who expired before being cleared to the hospital or who were perceived as untreatable by ambulance drivers or comrades and left to die on the field. In specific unit histories these unprovable statistical anomalies are directly confronted. It was reported
 that at GB on day 2 presumably near the Wheatfield Kershaw's Bgde was caught in the flank (enfiladed) by Union Arty. This tactical nightmare caused the 2nd Carolina infantry rgmt. 152 killed or wounded (37% of its strength) with 52 who were killed immediately (source )http://gbinfo.brinkster.net/casualties.htm)
  Barring someone else to do the work, assembling a real picture of ACW Arty's antipersonnel effectiveness would require reading virtually every ACW unit history in an attempt to build an overall statistical picture inferentially through amassing a sufficient number of anecdotal accounts. Only through this could one ascertain whether the experience of the 2ND Carolina was a singular occurrence or exemplary of what occurred fairly frequently when arty and infantry met in open terrain. We wouldn't expect the same outcomes from the Wilderness, Chicamauga, Stone's River or Chancellorsville which were fought in much more wooded terrain than GB. The final major variable is that ACW arty versus that in WW I and WW II  was most effective against infantry when it was on the defensive. IMOP the infantry V. Arty match in fairly open terrain usually came out in favor of the infantry if in open (skirmishing) formation as their weapons outranged the Arty whose horses and groups of close
 standing cannoneers presented better targets. 
  Dick
Batrinque at aol.com wrote: 
  Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:




In a message dated 2/15/2008 8:54:41 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, 
Batrinque at aol.com writes:

I find it to be a very solid account of the role that artillery played in 
the battle, using a detailed chronological narrative of the battle as its 
format. I don't know for certain that the experiences of every battery 
were at 
least touched upon, but I would not be surprised if that were the case. 
For my 
own part, I could wish that more background material regarding the 
technical 
aspects were given (but, I am the sort of geek who keeps copies of Gibbon's 

"Artillerist's Manual" and Benton's "Ordnance and Gunnery" on his shelves). 

The maps are clear and numerous (as might be expected from the author of 
"The 
Maps of Gettysburg").


And I should mention, relating to my own pet hobby horse, that I was glad to 
see that Gottfried discarded the tired old unlikely myth of the final shot of 
Arnold's Battery into the ranks of the 26th North Carolina.


Bruce Trinque
Amston, CT




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