GDG- Intelligence wins battles

[Tom Ryan]

	For some time I have been researching how the ANV and AoP were organized
from an intelligence perspective, and how well each side implemented an
information gathering plan during the Gettysburg Campaign.  Prior to the
arrival of Joe Hooker as commander in early 1863, the AoP's intelligence
system was unreliable at best, while the ANV under Lee was quite successful
in gaining the upper hand from an intelligence perspective during its
campaigns.

	Good intelligence requires attention to detail.  On May 31, 1863, Fifth
Corps commander George Meade sent a message to Hooker saying that he had
gotten hold of two Confederate newspapers -- normally a valuable commodity
for gaining intelligence about enemy activity.  On June 1,  Hooker's chief
of staff, Dan Butterfield, admonished Meade saying, although you said you
had gotten two Rebel newspapers, only one was received here at army
headquarters.

	Butterfield called Meade's attention to General Orders No. 40 of April 10,
1863 that, among other things, stated that officers had the duty to forward
all newspapers to the provost marshal general at army headquarters.  This
meant that newspapers would be examined by Col. George Sharpe's intelligence
staff, the Bureau of Military Information, that was part of the PMG
organization.

	Since good intelligence requires attention to detail, I thought this
missing newspaper incident was a good example of how things had changed
within the AoP regarding the importance of gaining information about the
enemy prior to undertaking military operations.  General Orders No. 40 had
laid out in some detail how officers on the front lines were to conduct
themselves with regard to gathering and forwarding information, and
specified that officers "will be held responsible that their reports from
the front are perfectly reliable."  This was in reference to the fact that
Hooker had had to reprimand "officers who send incorrect information from
the picket lines" about the strength of enemy units confronting them.

	This changed attitude regarding the collection and use of intelligence on
the part of the AoP meant trouble ahead for the Confederates during the
upcoming Gettysburg Campaign.

Tom