GDG- Meade/Gibbon on 2 July 1863
John Baniszewski
jdbano2001 at yahoo.com
Thu Nov 15 12:27:06 CST 2007
I don't see any reason why Meade's actions (or lack of actions) shed any light on whether or not the quote is accurate. One of Meade's greatest strengths was to identify the full range of significant risks to his army, and come up with a plan that would give him the ability to react to multiple risks. He never put all his eggs in one basket. The disposition and use of his reserves on Day 2 was the key to victory on that day - General Howard himself told Lincoln that. His positioning of reserves on Day 3 was also sound. Even if he thought that the attack would be against Gibbon's front, he knew he could be wrong, so he positioned his reserves where they could be used in multiple scenarios. It turned out that Gibbon did not really need any reserves - in my opinion, Longstreet's assault did not even come close to success. But the reserves were on the way, and would have arrived in time to deal with and probably stop any breakthrough.
John Baniszewski
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