GDG- Re:more on hollow squares
Laurence Schiller
lds307 at northwestern.edu
Sun May 6 16:13:34 CDT 2007
Greetings, all: I realize this a few weeks old, but I hadn't had a
chance to respond to Greg. Actually, my post was pointing out that
pure sabre attacks (or pistol on occasion), were rare UNLESS
accompanied by a ground attack. In most of the instances Greg points
out, mounted cavalry cooperated either with infantry or dismounted
cavalry. This was my point about the development of the American
Dragoon. On both sides, cavalry began to be used as a combined arms
force - At Selma, for example, most of the attack was made by
dismounted troopers armed with multiple shot carbines and ONLY as the
Confederate line was breaking, did a mounted charge go in. Very rare
was the mounted charge against infantry that wasn't already under
pressure. Ultimately, I don't think Greg and I are disagreeing, I
just didn't express myself fully.
Best,
Laurie Schiller
On Apr 18, 2007, at 11:47 AM, Biggsk at aol.com wrote:
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> Laurie writes:
>
>>>>> Squares were developed to protect infantry formations against
>>>>> charging
> heavy cavalry, something we never had in the ACW.>>>>
>
> In the Napoleonic Wars, squares were formed against the attack of
> any type
> of cavalry, not just the heavy cuirassiers. Hussars and lancers, both
> considered light cavalry back then, also attacked squares, the
> lancers having a bit
> of an advantage with the long reach of their lances. As an aside,
> the German
> Army still had lancer units as late as 1918 and used them in
> pursuing broken
> Allied formations during the Ludendorff Offensive where the broke
> the
> Allied lines.
>
>
>>>>> The light cavalry (more accurately dragoons) that were fielded
>>>>> in the
> ACW on both sides rarely attacked unshaken infantry. On those
> occasions they
> did charge infantry that wasn't on the verge of breaking, they
> suffered
> severely. That was not their role and you rarely find them doing
> it. So, as there
> was no heavy cavalry, there was no real need for squares.>>>
> I would disagree here. There are a number of examples where
> cavalry attacked
> unshaken infantry and broke them or routed them on the field during
> the
> Civil War. Brent Nosworthy cites a few in his amazing "Bloody
> Crucible Of
> Courage" but I can also cite a few:
>
> 1) The Battle of Lavergne, TN (10/62). Union cavalry, in
> conjunction with
> a Union infantry attack, broke the Confederate infantry line and
> routed them.
>
> 2) Battle of Richmond, KY. Scott's CS cavalry brigade, also in
> conjunction
> with a Confederate infantry assault, routed the Union infantry
> formations
> and in the ensuing pursuit, ended up capturing the bulk of the
> Union force.
>
> 3) Battle of Third Winchester (9/64) A five brigade charge of
> Union cavalry
> shatters the Confederate line causing its complete collapse.
>
> 4) Cedar Creek. Union cavalry envelops the Confederate infantry
> line
> causing its complete collapse.
>
> 5) Battle of Nashville. Over two days, Wilson's Union cavalry
> hammers the
> Confederate left flank, held by infantry and on Day 1 dug in behind
> a series
> of redoubts, and causes the complete collapse of Hood's CS army -
> the biggest
> defeat ever inflicted on a whole army in the Civil War.
>
> 6) Battle of Selma. Wilson's Union cavalry corps slams through the
> earthwork defenses of Bedford Forrest's dismounted troopers and
> local militia around
> the city in a combined mounted and dismounted assault.
>
> 7) Sailor's Creek. Rampaging Union cavalry cuts off a third of
> Lee's army -
> an infantry corps basically.
>
> 8) Ft. Donelson (2/62). Forrest's cavalry regiment and a
> supporting KY
> cavalry battalion, in some of the worst terrain imaginable, rout
> the Union
> cavalry and in conjunction with the CS infantry assault, drive
> back John
> McClernand's Division, ultimately shattering the defense line in a
> combined arms
> attack with the 2nd KY Infantry (CS) against the 11th Illinois
> Infantry.
>
> 9) Battle of Shelbyville, TN (6/63) Minty's cavalry brigade charged
> dismounted CS cavalry at a barricade in Guy's Gap, taking the place
> and driving the
> Confederates back into the earthworks of Shelbyville. Then, in a
> combined
> arms mounted-dismounted assault, carried those works and drove the
> Confederate
> troopers back into the Duck River - literally! It was Joe
> Wheeler's worst
> defeat of the war.
>
> 10) First Manassas (7/61) - Jeb Stuart's troopers smash through the
> battle
> line of the NY Fire Zouaves routing them.
>
> 11) Any number of Forrest's engagements can be cited, but one of my
> favorites is at Parker's Crossroads (12/62) where he and only his
> escort of some 100
> men, rode across the front and then wheeled left and struck the
> flanks of a
> full Union infantry brigade that had appeared in his rear as they
> were forming
> lines of battle. This was a veteran brigade (Fuller's Ohio) and
> Forrest's
> mounted attack stopped their advance cold, allowing his other
> troopers to
> remount, limber their guns, and get off the field. Brice's
> Crossroads also
> features some mounted attacks against both Union cavalry and
> infantry.
>
> Some of these assaults came with supporting infantry and some did
> not.
> There's more examples out there if one digs enough. Dismounted
> troopers are
> basically infantry and many Confederate troopers out West carried
> infantry long
> arms so as to be on an even keel with Union infantry.
>
> Basically, it comes down to the commander, proper massing of
> sufficient
> cavalry to do the job, supporting elements like horse artillery and
> infantry and
> the proper place to do the attack. Farnsworth's charge was not
> properly
> handled and the terrain was terrible. That PA cavalry regiment
> that attacked
> down the narrow road at Chancellorsville was not properly deployed
> for such an
> attack.
>
> Keep in mind that a good soldier could maybe get three rounds per
> minute out
> of his musket and charging cavalry could close the gap quite
> rapidly during
> the reloading interludes. Thus they might only receive a two to five
> volleys before hitting the opposing infantry. Somewhere I have the
> figures for
> such calculations of rate of closure versus rounds thrown back.
> Additionally,
> the sight of a few thousand horses charging at you is extremely
> terrifying and
> it took sturdy men to hold a line against that.
>
> If an attack is poorly planned, not properly led or massed and the
> objective
> is not on suitable terrain for the operation, then it will
> probably fail.
> There was an air assault in one of the Iraq wars by the Apache
> battalion of
> the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division and it was not properly
> supported by
> fixed wing aircraft, and the choppers got hammered pretty badly,
> most of them
> damaged to some degree or another.
>
> Combined arms still matters and always did matter. But yet you
> can find
> cases in the Civil War where a cavalry attack defeated an infantry
> unit. It
> came down to leadership, skill, shock and speed of attack, proper
> terrain and
> the toughness (or lack thereof) of the attacked - and some of
> Napoleon's
> favorite general - luck.
>
> Greg Biggs
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ************************************** See what's free at http://
> www.aol.com.
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> You may unsubscribe by going to http://mailman.arthes.com/mailman/
> listinfo/gettysburg
>
> You can add yourself to the GDG map at: http://www.frappr.com/
> gettysburgdiscussiongroup
>
> View archived posts from May 2004 - present at http://
> mailman.arthes.com/pipermail/gettysburg/
>
Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller
lds307 at northwestern.edu
Maitre d'Armes
Head Fencing Coach Department of History
Northwestern University
Commissioner, Midwest Fencing Conference
Midwest VP, US Fencing Coaches' Association
Vice-Chair USFA Illinois Division
Lds307 at northwestern.edu
847-491-4654
FAX 847-467-1406
Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/
More information about the Gettysburg
mailing list