GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Laurence D. Schiller]

Hi Tom:


>Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
>Laurie,
>
>	Thanks for your response.  A few follow-on comments.
>
>(snip)
>	An excellent article.  Highly recommended.  I read it when it 
>first came
>out, and have referred to it since.  What is the BGES monograph?  I would
>like to get hold of a copy.

Thank you. Someday I'll get the book done on tactics north and south. 
The BGES is the Blue Gray Education Society. Google their website - 
but I don't know if they still have copies or not.

>
><<I understand and appreciate your point, but I'm simply
>suggesting that if Stuart is coming up the Valley with Lee, then so
>much begins to change that we have difficulty pinpointing any
>specific thing, such as the capture of Culps Hill.>>
>
>	Agreed.  My specific point in the original post was to illustrate how
>dependent Lee was on Stuart for intel, and what a great loss it was not to
>have him available for the run-up to Gettysburg.  By indulging in a couple
>of what ifs, that tended to cloud this point I'm afraid.

Fair enough!

>
><<I primarily blame Lee for 1) writing vague orders and 2) for failing to
>grasp the timeline
>Stuart would have to fulfill to actually make it to Ewell's flank on
>time.>>
>
>	There is another aspect of Lee's actions that I have yet to see pointed
>out.  That is his failure to hold Hill and Longstreet in place before having
>them cross the Potomac in order to give Stuart sufficient time to pass
>through the Union positions.  By sending Hill/Longstreet across on the
>25th/26th, the same time that Stuart was attempting to negotiate his
>movement, that is what triggered the Union army in pursuit -- and blocked
>Stuart's route.  By being more attentive to this potential problem and
>waiting just one more day to release H/L, Lee might have facilitated Stuart
>being able to pass through uninhibited.

Interesting point and one I hadn't considered. That would have made a 
difference yet, Stuart still would have had to have things go pretty 
perfect to get to Ewell on time.

>
><<But Stuart is also guilty of willing to take a big risk to
>counteract the damage of Brandy Station.>>
>
>	While one can speculate that this is the case, I have yet to find any
>evidence to prove this one way or the other.  On the contrary, I look at the
>attempt to negotiate Stuart's cavalry through the Union army as a joint
>decision by Stuart, Lee and Longstreet.  The final decision by Stuart, after
>he was blocked, to go around the Union army rather than backtracking to the
>mountains was a judgment call that can be argued both ways -- and has been
>on this board with some coming down on both sides.  But I just do not see
>that Stuart was whacked out psychologically because of Brandy Station.  As a
>matter of fact, that was already more than two weeks old, and a lot of water
>had gone over the dam since then.  Especially considering the Loudoun County
>cavalry battles, in which Stuart held up his end of the bargain pretty well.

I'm not suggesting he was so much 'whacked out' but rather that he'd 
not been having the best Spring compared to '62 and that plus his 
personality tended to push him towards a more risky decision that 
ended up not working out. That's all.

Thanks

Laurie Schiller

>
>Regards, Tom
>
>
> 
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-- 
Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller
Maitre d'Armes
Head Fencing Coach
Department of History
Northwestern University
Commissioner, Midwest Fencing Conference
Midwest VP, US Fencing Coaches' Association
Vice-Chair USFA Illinois Division
Lds307 at northwestern.edu
847-491-4654
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