GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Tom Ryan]

Laurie,

	Thanks for your response.  A few follow-on comments.

<<I well understand the functions of cavalry - my article on the
evolution of Federal cavalry tactics appeared in the January 1999
issue of North and South (and an expanded version in a BGES
monograph).>>

	An excellent article.  Highly recommended.  I read it when it first came
out, and have referred to it since.  What is the BGES monograph?  I would
like to get hold of a copy.

<<I understand and appreciate your point, but I'm simply
suggesting that if Stuart is coming up the Valley with Lee, then so
much begins to change that we have difficulty pinpointing any
specific thing, such as the capture of Culps Hill.>>

	Agreed.  My specific point in the original post was to illustrate how
dependent Lee was on Stuart for intel, and what a great loss it was not to
have him available for the run-up to Gettysburg.  By indulging in a couple
of what ifs, that tended to cloud this point I'm afraid.

<<I primarily blame Lee for 1) writing vague orders and 2) for failing to
grasp the timeline
Stuart would have to fulfill to actually make it to Ewell's flank on
time.>>

	There is another aspect of Lee's actions that I have yet to see pointed
out.  That is his failure to hold Hill and Longstreet in place before having
them cross the Potomac in order to give Stuart sufficient time to pass
through the Union positions.  By sending Hill/Longstreet across on the
25th/26th, the same time that Stuart was attempting to negotiate his
movement, that is what triggered the Union army in pursuit -- and blocked
Stuart's route.  By being more attentive to this potential problem and
waiting just one more day to release H/L, Lee might have facilitated Stuart
being able to pass through uninhibited.

<<But Stuart is also guilty of willing to take a big risk to
counteract the damage of Brandy Station.>>

	While one can speculate that this is the case, I have yet to find any
evidence to prove this one way or the other.  On the contrary, I look at the
attempt to negotiate Stuart's cavalry through the Union army as a joint
decision by Stuart, Lee and Longstreet.  The final decision by Stuart, after
he was blocked, to go around the Union army rather than backtracking to the
mountains was a judgment call that can be argued both ways -- and has been
on this board with some coming down on both sides.  But I just do not see
that Stuart was whacked out psychologically because of Brandy Station.  As a
matter of fact, that was already more than two weeks old, and a lot of water
had gone over the dam since then.  Especially considering the Loudoun County
cavalry battles, in which Stuart held up his end of the bargain pretty well.

Regards, Tom