GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Laurence D. Schiller]

Greetings Tom:
	Just back from our Conference Championships so, haven't had 
the computer open.


>(snip my letter)



>Hi Laurie,
>
>	Just trying to illustrate how important Stuart was to the success or
>failure of the ANV at Gettysburg.  I think a few examples of what good
>recon, scouting and screening can do to change the fortunes of a battle or a
>campaign are not uncalled for in this case.

I well understand the functions of cavalry - my article on the 
evolution of Federal cavalry tactics appeared in the January 1999 
issue of North and South (and an expanded version in a BGES 
monograph). I understand and appreciate your point, but I'm simply 
suggesting that if Stuart is coming up the Valley with Lee, then so 
much begins to change that we have difficulty pinpointing any 
specific thing, such as the capture of Culps Hill.

>
>	By the way, your throwaway line about "if Stuart is doing his 
>job and not
>riding around the AoP" is an example of how historians down through the
>decades have misunderstood what actually happened and why with regard to
>Stuart's absence from the ANV for several days during the Gettysburg
>Campaign.  It has been a lonely battle, but I have contended for some time
>that Stuart was not on a glory ride or intentionally out grabbing headlines.

Fair enough - I didn't mean to imply that for I primarily blame Lee 
for 1) writing vague orders and 2) for failing to grasp the timeline 
Stuart would have to fulfill to actually make it to Ewell's flank on 
time. But Stuart is also guilty of willing to take a big risk to 
counteract the damage of Brandy Station. I don't think you are so 
alone on that point for I basically agree with you.

>What happened on June 25 to block Stuart's route was a combination of
>circumstances that were almost completely out of Stuart's control.  Eric and
>J.D.'s book "Plenty of Blame to Go Around" does the best job of laying out
>the facts.  But the thing to keep in mind is that is was decisions on the
>Union side that caused Stuart's problems.  Good intelligence and fast action
>led to the beginning of Hooker's march across the Potomac on June 25 -- and
>Stuart's intended ride through the Union army was negated, and he was forced
>to go around the army instead.

Yes, but neither Stuart nor Lee considered how long it would take him 
to accomplish what was suggested. Wayne Wachmuth's tour a few musters 
ago amply pointed out that everything had to be perfect for Stuart to 
get where he had to go on time and in war, nothing is ever perfect.

>
>	The thing that should be kept in mind is that Stuart was a professional
>soldier, and acted in that manner in almost all occasions and under all
>circumstances.  To imply that he would intentionally leave his army in the
>lurch is simply unsupported by fact.

I admit I sounded like I was suggesting that, but I didn't mean to. 
You are quite correct.

Best,

laurie Schiller

>
>	I say this not as a Stuart devotee or an ANV supporter or 
>anything of that
>character, since I always attempt to remain neutral on historical subjects.
>Simply searching for the truth.
>
>Regards, Tom
>
> 
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-- 
Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller
Maitre d'Armes
Head Fencing Coach
Department of History
Northwestern University
Commissioner, Midwest Fencing Conference
Midwest VP, US Fencing Coaches' Association
Vice-Chair USFA Illinois Division
Lds307 at northwestern.edu
847-491-4654
FAX 847-467-1406
Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/