GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

James Cameron cameron2 at optonline.net
Fri Mar 2 20:45:09 CST 2007


<< I wanted to post some of my thoughts on Ewell's failure to press the 
attack
on the first day.

As I understand the incident, Lee ordered Ewell to take the hights "if
practicable". Ewell then ordered Johnson's fresh division to scout Culp's
Hill. After delivering that order, Ewell wen to Lee for advice on how to
proceed. As it turned out, only a few battered Union regiments were
stationed on Culp's Hill, but Johnson's scouts were frightened by picketts
on the hill. As a result, any attack was called off.

Personally, I think the primary blame lies with Ewell and Johnson together.
It would seem that Ewell, instead of going to Lee and leaving Johnson on his
own, should have stayed on the field and asked Lee to come to him. It seems
that Ewell's main problem was not his indecisiveness, but how he handled
that problem. Instead of sending a small scouting party, he should have sent
skirmishers onto the hill to probe for Union troops. I think Johnson was too
quick to call off the attack. It would seem that Ewell could have taken
Culp's Hill with a well-planned assault, and then used that ground to attack
Cemetery Hill the next day. >>

There are actually two different, although related, situations involved 
here.  One is the question of Ewell's decision not to attempt an attack on 
Cemetery Hill, the other, not making an effort to occupy Culp's Hill.

Most of the often severe criticism directed at Ewell revolves around his 
decision not to attack Cemetery Hill, and whether he was right or wrong not 
to have tried.  Your question seems to focus more on Culp's Hill, so all 
I'll say about Cemetery Hill is that I think many of Ewell's critics tend to 
start from the premise that such an attack would have been a sure success. 
And since success was certain, he was by definition wrong not to have made 
the attempt.  My personal opinion is that mounting such an attack would have 
been extremely difficult, and its success far from a foregone conclusion. 
The correct question, as I see it, is not whether Ewell made the right or 
wrong decision.  That, ultimately, is unknowable.  Rather, the question is 
whether the decision Ewell made not to attack was a reasonable one, under 
the prevailing circumstances.  I think it was.

Culp's Hill is a different matter.  It was very late in the day before 
Johnston's division was on the field.  It may have been possible, even after 
dark, for him to have ordered troops up onto the hill to occupy it, had 
there been no indication they would encounter resistance.  But once there 
was indication of Union troops on the hill, it was too late to plan, deploy 
for, and mount any kind of attack.

Jim Cameron




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