GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Tom Ryan]

Hi J.D.,

	The critical point that I look at in measuring the absence of Stuart
initially is June 29, when, as I understand it, Lee sent scouts out to
verify the spy Harrison's information he brought on the 28th that Hooker had
crossed the Potomac and was marching northward through Maryland.

	At the same time on the 29th, Buford was following instructions to move
from present-day Thurmont to Gettysburg to look for the ANV.  Somehow Lee's
scouts did not run into Buford's two brigades that presumably should have
been on a collision path -- one heading northward and the other southward.
It seems logical that if Stuart had been with Lee at Chambersburg, his units
would have been out searching for the Union army with a brigade or more
rather just a few of Lee's scouts, and would have discovered Buford's cav
heading toward Fairfield and Gettysburg.

	By reporting that fact to Lee, Lee could have hurried Hill's corps on to
Gettysburg to capture the good ground prior to Buford's arrival.

	Beyond that, we both know how aggressive Stuart was in reconnoitering when
traveling with the army.  His standard practice was to have guards in the
advance and rear as well as on the flanks, to smoke out any obstacles in the
army's path.  Not to mention he often freelanced in the sense of
anticipating trouble before it happened by sending out scouting parties.

	My sense is that, if he were with Lee on the march into Pennsylvania,
things would have been a lot different.  Or, if he arrived with Ewell,
having successfully maneuvered past the Union army in Virgina, things would
have been a lot different on July 1 as well.  Not to mention that Stuart's
presence on July 2 would have given Lee more flexibility in getting around
the Union left flank if he chose to do so.

	These scenarios aside, the point I was trying to make in response to Todd
was that Lee was dependent on Stuart, even overly so, and Stuart's absence
made a great difference to the outcome at Gettysburg.  The evidence for this
being the history of practically every battle fought by Johnston and Lee
prior to Gettysburg reflects the key role of cavalry in the outcome.  My
research and instincts tell me that, if Lee had not been denied Stuart's
support for those seven or eight days in June and July, the outcome of the
Battle of Gettysburg would have ended  differently.

	Having said that, the credit for Stuart being absent from Gettysburg
justifiably goes to the Union army and its intelligence assets that kept a
close watch on the ANV as it marched into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and
triggered the decision for the movement north of the Potomac that,
unbeknownst to them, blocked Stuart's ability to pass through the AoP's
previously stationary position and denied Lee the wherewithal to win the
upcoming battle.

Regards, Tom

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of J. David Petruzzi
Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2007 1:25 PM
To: GDG
Subject: RE: GDG- Ewell and the High Ground


Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Tom Ryan wrote:

>>The stumbling and fumbling that went on regarding Cemetery Hill and Culp's
Hill was a mere reflection of Stuart's absence.  If he had been with the
army, undoubtedly Culp's Hill would have been in the hands of the ANV.  As a
matter of fact, if Stuart had been available, it is even more likely that
the ANV would have arrived at Gettysburg first, and the situation would have
been reversed with the ANV on the high ground and the Union army trying to
decide how to confront this near impregnable position.>>

Hi Tom,

I think you probably know my opinion on this pretty well by now :-)  I'm not
so sure that the statements above aren't arguable - for instance, we often
hear that if Stuart were available to Lee on June 30 or July 1, the ANV
would have taken Gettysburg.  Let's look at that closely.

We have to assume that Stuart would have advanced to Gettysburg with Heth at
all.  We have to change two events for this to happen, not just one - first,
of course, Stuart must be available; secondly, and more importantly, Heth
(or someone higher) would have had to have requested Stuart to accompany
him.  We know that more than 2 brigades of cavalry were available in spite
of Stuart's absence, and none were requested - not by Heth, not by Hill, not
by anyone else.  Not only that, but Heth marched to Gettysburg with his
artillery in the van - described by him later as not being as "cautious" as
he could have been.  This is why I always ask folks who make the broad
contention that "if Stuart were available, there wouldn't have been a
Gettysburg..." and also why Eric Wittenberg and I make the contention in our
book that things on July 1 might not have been all that different.  In
summation, then, you can't change just one variable to put Stuart at
Gettysburg anytime by early afternoon - you must change TWO.  IMO, changing
one variable is a "what-if" and having to change two is a fantasy.  We can't
just have Stuart at
Chambersburg or Cashtown - we have to change many, many events on the eve of
June 30/morning of July 1 to get him to Gettysburg at all.

	>>The fact that neither Lee nor Ewell used the cavalry that was available
to
them (Jenkins' brigade, White's battalion and the 1st Maryland) to scout the
ground, however irresponsible on their part, seems to be another reflection
of how dependent Lee was on Stuart personally for gathering information and
providing advice on battlefield tactics.>>


Exactly, and I can't argue with that - but it also reflects the decisions
that were made that day, especially by subordinates.  As with what I stated
above, you have to put Stuart on the ground again - again changing a whole
host of events that led up to the afternoon of July 1.  We can airdrop
Stuart and his three "best" brigades down onto the battlefield at various
times - morning of July 1, afternoon of July 1, morning of July 2 etc.
etc... but in doing so we can't ignore the multitude of variables that would
necessitate it.  It's extremely interesting to muse about what effect Stuart
would have had at various points in time, but in doing so we have to make
sure we're considering how much of history we'd have to change in order to
make that happen.  If we knock down one domino on the table, it doesn't just
fall alone - it knocks down every other one behind it, completely changing
what you have left.

J.D.

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