GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[J. David Petruzzi]

Tom Ryan wrote:

>>The stumbling and fumbling that went on regarding Cemetery Hill and Culp's
Hill was a mere reflection of Stuart's absence.  If he had been with the
army, undoubtedly Culp's Hill would have been in the hands of the ANV.  As a
matter of fact, if Stuart had been available, it is even more likely that
the ANV would have arrived at Gettysburg first, and the situation would have
been reversed with the ANV on the high ground and the Union army trying to
decide how to confront this near impregnable position.>>

Hi Tom,

I think you probably know my opinion on this pretty well by now :-)  I'm not
so sure that the statements above aren't arguable - for instance, we often
hear that if Stuart were available to Lee on June 30 or July 1, the ANV
would have taken Gettysburg.  Let's look at that closely.

We have to assume that Stuart would have advanced to Gettysburg with Heth at
all.  We have to change two events for this to happen, not just one - first,
of course, Stuart must be available; secondly, and more importantly, Heth
(or someone higher) would have had to have requested Stuart to accompany
him.  We know that more than 2 brigades of cavalry were available in spite
of Stuart's absence, and none were requested - not by Heth, not by Hill, not
by anyone else.  Not only that, but Heth marched to Gettysburg with his
artillery in the van - described by him later as not being as "cautious" as
he could have been.  This is why I always ask folks who make the broad
contention that "if Stuart were available, there wouldn't have been a
Gettysburg..." and also why Eric Wittenberg and I make the contention in our
book that things on July 1 might not have been all that different.  In
summation, then, you can't change just one variable to put Stuart at
Gettysburg anytime by early afternoon - you must change TWO.  IMO, changing
one variable is a "what-if" and having to change two is a fantasy.  We can't
just have Stuart at
Chambersburg or Cashtown - we have to change many, many events on the eve of
June 30/morning of July 1 to get him to Gettysburg at all.

	>>The fact that neither Lee nor Ewell used the cavalry that was available
to
them (Jenkins' brigade, White's battalion and the 1st Maryland) to scout the
ground, however irresponsible on their part, seems to be another reflection
of how dependent Lee was on Stuart personally for gathering information and
providing advice on battlefield tactics.>>


Exactly, and I can't argue with that - but it also reflects the decisions
that were made that day, especially by subordinates.  As with what I stated
above, you have to put Stuart on the ground again - again changing a whole
host of events that led up to the afternoon of July 1.  We can airdrop
Stuart and his three "best" brigades down onto the battlefield at various
times - morning of July 1, afternoon of July 1, morning of July 2 etc.
etc... but in doing so we can't ignore the multitude of variables that would
necessitate it.  It's extremely interesting to muse about what effect Stuart
would have had at various points in time, but in doing so we have to make
sure we're considering how much of history we'd have to change in order to
make that happen.  If we knock down one domino on the table, it doesn't just
fall alone - it knocks down every other one behind it, completely changing
what you have left.

J.D.