GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Jack Kelly]

> As I understand the incident, Lee ordered Ewell to take the hights "if
> practicable". Ewell then ordered Johnson's fresh division to scout Culp's
> Hill. After delivering that order, Ewell wen to Lee for advice on how to
> proceed. As it turned out, only a few battered Union regiments were
> stationed on Culp's Hill, but Johnson's scouts were frightened by picketts
> on the hill. As a result, any attack was called off.

Several things worked against Lee's orders.  First, most of Ewell's troops 
were pretty scattered and disorganized by the day's fighting, making 
Johnson's division the only units aable to carry out the assault.  Johnson, 
however, was preoccupied by reports of Union flanking cavalry on 
Brinckerhof's Ridge, and the presence of elements of Williams's (Slocum's) 
corps moving toward the Confederate left flank (Benner's Hill area) up the 
Hanover Road.  Although the cavalry reports were exaggerated, Williams 
actually advanced as far as the Daniel Lady farm before changing direction 
toward the Round Tops.  Johnson, therefore, was not able to get his leading 
units to the Culp's Hill area until nearly dark, until all these flanking 
reports were checked out.  By the time he put together a recon unit, the 7th 
Indiana (an Iron Brigade unit which did not see action on Day 1 since they 
were guarding the wagon trains) had reached Culp's Hill.  The 7th IN sent a 
company of skirmishers down the east side of Culp's Hill once they got to 
the Hill. Johnson's recon unit ran into an ambush set by these skirmishers, 
losing heavily, and reported back to Ewell that the Hill was held in force. 
It was very late by this time (late PM or early AM) so Ewell and Johnson 
held off any further action until dawn.  The difficulty of moving troops 
into attack position in darkness during the CW is well known, so I think 
that they were probably right in their decision.

I therefore do not think that Ewell could have done much more than he did 
regarding the Culp's/Cemetery Hill position.  Others have different 
opinions, I reckon.

Regards,

Jack Kelly

>
> Personally, I think the primary blame lies with Ewell and Johnson 
> together.
> It would seem that Ewell, instead of going to Lee and leaving Johnson on 
> his
> own, should have stayed on the field and asked Lee to come to him. It 
> seems
> that Ewell's main problem was not his indecisiveness, but how he handled
> that problem. Instead of sending a small scouting party, he should have 
> sent
> skirmishers onto the hill to probe for Union troops. I think Johnson was 
> too
> quick to call off the attack. It would seem that Ewell could have taken
> Culp's Hill with a well-planned assault, and then used that ground to 
> attack
> Cemetery Hill the next day.
>
> What do you think?
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