GDG- Ewell and the High Ground

[Tom Ryan]

<<Personally, I think the primary blame lies with Ewell and Johnson
together.
It would seem that Ewell, instead of going to Lee and leaving Johnson on his
own, should have stayed on the field and asked Lee to come to him. It seems
that Ewell's main problem was not his indecisiveness, but how he handled
that problem. Instead of sending a small scouting party, he should have sent
skirmishers onto the hill to probe for Union troops. I think Johnson was too
quick to call off the attack. It would seem that Ewell could have taken
Culp's Hill with a well-planned assault, and then used that ground to attack
Cemetery Hill the next day.>>

Todd,

	The history of Confederate success on the battlefield from the outset of
the war in the East has a direct relationship to scouting the enemy's
position for information, and screening the enemy from learning vital facts
about the location and intention of the Rebels.  Starting with Bull Run, the
Peninsula, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville,
it was Stuart and the cavalry that established the basic terms on which the
battle would be fought, and guided and protected the infantry during the
actual fighting.

	Factor in the absence of Stuart on July 1 at Gettysburg, and you have the
answer why things began to fall apart like they did.  Without cavalry an
army is without intelligence, unless it has an alternative intelligence
function which the ANV did not.  Without intelligence, an army finds it
extremely difficult to win battles.  All the other back and forth between
Ewell and Lee is a mere reflection of how dependent the army was on Stuart
and the cavalry -- their primary and almost exclusive intelligence asset.

	A minor, yet important, exception was Longstreet's scout Harrison, who
delayed the inevitable by alerting Lee that the Army of the Potomac was
marching to overtake his army.  This scout, however, could not make up for
the much more important reconnaissance, scouting, and screening that Stuart
normally provided for Lee and the army, and on which Lee had grown ever so
dependent for his decision making.

	The stumbling and fumbling that went on regarding Cemetery Hill and Culp's
Hill was a mere reflection of Stuart's absence.  If he had been with the
army, undoubtedly Culp's Hill would have been in the hands of the ANV.  As a
matter of fact, if Stuart had been available, it is even more likely that
the ANV would have arrived at Gettysburg first, and the situation would have
been reversed with the ANV on the high ground and the Union army trying to
decide how to confront this near impregnable position.

	The volidity of this argument is seen in how Lee depended on Stuart to
guide and support his retreat from Gettysburg.  Without the cavalry, Lee
would have been literally dead in the water trying to withdraw from
Gettysburg.  At every point along the route, it was the cavalry that held
off the pursuit and gave Lee an opportunity to entrench at Williamsport to
make a stand prior to crossing the river.

	The fact that neither Lee nor Ewell used the cavalry that was available to
them (Jenkins' brigade, White's battalion and the 1st Maryland) to scout the
ground, however irresponsible on their part, seems to be another reflection
of how dependent Lee was on Stuart personally for gathering information and
providing advice on battlefield tactics.

Tom Ryan