GDG- Re: Richmond as capitol

[Biggsk at aol.com]

Tom writes:

>>>>Rather than "strategic folly," I think Jefferson Davis  made a prudent 
decision in moving the capital to Richmond, given his limited  options at the 
time.  Like Lincoln, Davis had to compromise with  politicians to ensure their 
support for his administration.  He knew that  secession would founder without 
the state of Virginia as a signatory.  It  was not only the most populous 
state in the South, but also the most  industrialized.>>>>

By the end of the war Georgia's industrial might was much larger than  
Virginia's thanks to the far-sighted vision of Josiah Gorgas and his Ordnance  
Bureau, who believed it was lunacy to put such valuable industries so close to  the 
war zones along the northern borders of the CSA.  Tennessee's was very  close 
to Virginia's in terms of manufacturing capabilities and in the end Selma,  
Al cast many more large caliber cannons than did Tredegar (and the guns were  
better too).  Both Georgia and Tennessee had superior railroads to Virginia  
for all of the tracks went through the cities (not the case in VA and NC) and  
they were the same five foot gauge (three gauges in VA - two in NC at  least).  
Thus, for war and communication purposes, both TN and GA were  better 
prepared and when you add in the Deep South's food production  capabilities, which 
dwarfed the vaunted Shenandoah Valley, that adds even  more.  Virtually all of 
the war-time new industrial expansion was in the  Deep South simply because is 
was much further away from the front lines.   By 1863 Lee was getting almost 
all of his food from Georgia - to the detriment  of the AOT in Tennessee I 
might add.
 
If this made sense economically then it should have made sense   politically 
for the capitol to have been in Atlanta, which lobbied very  intensely for it. 
 The same common sense should have applied to  the capitol.  Having it in VA 
put one giant ball and chain around the ANV  making sure that it could not 
maneuver too far and wide away, whereas the AOT in  the West could go much furth
er and even accomplish more strategically at times  than the ANV (the KY 
Campaign) at the same time.
 
I happen to think that Virginia would have gone out anyway without the  
capitol being there - the other later seceding states would have shamed them at  
worst into doing so, but being Southerners they would have gone out.
 
 


>>>>In addition there is evidence that Davis wanted to  be closer to the 
front in order to better guide military operations.  The  problems in the West 
that you cite I believe were caused more by inadequate  military leadership there 
and less by political  neglect.>>>>

Well, considering how he did that might not have been such a good  idea!  He 
was the worst kind of micro-manager (note that there were 6 Sec  Wars in the 
CSA!!!) because he tinkered too much and lacked a pro-active vision  for the 
west, which is where they would lose their war and the Union would win  it.
 
The root of the western problems was Davis himself.  His solution to  
defending the west was to create Dept. No. 2, which ran from the Appalachians to  the 
Mississippi River (later extended across it) and then not send any men or  
materiel to defend it - but only send Albert Sidney Johnston to command.   
Granted, as Davis said, "if Sidney Johnston is not a general then I have no  
generals," his esteem in Davis' eyes was huge, but Davis ham-strung the guy from  
the get-go.  He had, at best, 45,000 troops to hold this massive  front.  He 
wanted to create a mobile reserve based in Nashville but could  never get the men 
to do so.  When he appealed to Deep South governors for  more men, not only 
was he told by them that they had their own troubles (largely  made up they 
being afflicted with "local-itis"),  but when Davis found out  he jumped down 
Johnston's throat!
 
Lack of weapons was acute as well - and much of the 92,000 men that  
Tennessee alone raised in 1961 had to be disbanded for lack of weapons  thanks to the 
War Department saying that if no weapons could be secured then  such units 
were to be disbanded.  Johnston could really have used those  men!  Davis did 
nothing to help the problem, thus showing from the very  beginning that his 
attitude towards the west was going to be totally  reactive.  The buck stopped here 
at Davis' desk - not any of his general in  the west.  He utterly failed as 
president to mobilize his Deep South  governors to send more troops to the west.
 
Case in point - Georgia contributed huge numbers of men to the CS  Army.  Did 
you know that there were only two GA units at Shiloh (a battery  and a 
cavalry escort company) and only one full infantry regiment in the KY  Campaign  in 
the AOT (plus 2 cavalry units and a couple infantry regiments  operating in 
support in other parts of the state)?  The large levy of GA  units did not 
arrive in Tennessee until late 1862 and yet Tennessee by its very  position, 
protected not only GA, but also AL, MS and LA (something Beauregard  tried to 
impress on the Deep South while he was out west).
 
When you are totally reactive, you tend to lose the war.  It took the  loss 
of most of Tennessee by mid-February, 1862 to finally give Davis something  
close to a wake-up call and realize that he had to defend an entire nation - not  
just Virginia!  That is not necessarily the fault of the generals in the  
west, for they are playing the hand that Davis dealt them, but Davis on his own  
for not having anything resembling a strategic plan to defend his entire  
nation!
 
The only real times that the Confederates in the west, with Davis'  blessing, 
were pro-active were for Shiloh, where large reinforcements were sent  to 
attack Federal forces and regain initiative; the KY Campaign of 1862  (and they 
did much better than Lee did on his campaign of the same time),  which lacked 
any reinforcements, and when Davis sent more reinforcements  for Chickamauga 
where they won but failed to follow up.
 
In the interim, to protect Mississippi, Davis stripped troops from Bragg's  
Army of Tennessee right before big battles; 9000 men of Carter Stevenson's  Div
ision just before Stones River and a further 15,000 men right before the  
Tullahoma Campaign.  Because of these troop transfers the Tennessee front  would 
be conquered by the Union in mid-1863 much as it was in 1862 when Davis  failed 
as president to properly defend his nation - and he did that because he  was 
focused on Virginia!!!!! 


>>>> Whether or not Davis also wanted to insure that  Robert E. Lee would 
become an officer in the Confederate army may or may not  have been a motive on 
his part to move the capital to Richmond (and thereby  secure Virginia's 
allegiance).  Nonetheless, consider what would have  happened if Lee had remained 
with the Union and accepted command of the  Federal army.  It is likely that 
would have been game, set and match as  far as the South was concerned.>>>>

As I said, I think Virginia would have gone out anyway.
 


>>>>That notwithstanding, Davis could not risk the  possibility of Virginia 
opting to stay within the Union, and he dangled  the carrot of the capital 
relocated to Virginia as an incentive to  secede.  At the time, it must have 
seemed the logical thing for him to  do.>>>>




Even logical is debatable when the strategic implications, as I have  
mentioned, were so grave for the Confederacy.
 
A very bad choice and they lost because of it.
 
Greg Biggs



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