GDG- Cavalry (again): Buford's withdrawal

[Chet Diestel]

Esteemed GDG Member Alan D. Brunelle Contributes:

    I'm working my way through "The Cavalry at Gettysburg" by Edward G. 
Longacre, and I'm at the section covering Buford's actions on the 2nd   day. 
My (previous) understanding concerning Buford's leaving the field of battle 
on 2 July (based upon more general studies) seemed to indicate:

    * Buford's troops were beaten up and tired from almost a month of 
fighting, marching, and the battle on 1 July
     * He was ordered to go to the railhead supply base at Westminster by 
Pleasonton for refit, and Meade was fully aware of this.
    * There was some assumption that Pleasonton would replace Buford with 
some other cavalry, which wasn't done.

     So I've always assumed that the major blame was upon Pleasonton, with 
perhaps some mild censure on Meade for not being specific and/or not 
checking on things. (Mitigated by the sheer magnitude of managing the 
on-going battle: after the quotes below, Longacre states: "In the midst of a 
growing battle, Meade faced a mob of concern, Buford's replacement being 
only one." [pg 206])
    I gather from Longacre that it might not be that simple, from page 205:

  "The morning's fighting, sharp though it was, cost Devin fewer than a 
half dozen casualties. Given its five percent loss rate of the day before, 
Buford's division remained in good shape, especially since Merritt's 
brigade, now moving toward Emmitsburg from Mechanicstown,  Maryland, had not 
been engaged. Still, Buford worried about the strength of his command, which 
he could not recruit [adb: perhaps he meant  resupply?] without the wagons 
traveling with Merritt. Early that morning  he had requested of Pleasonton 
(now encamped about a half mile below  Meade's headquarters along the 
Taneytown road) to be allowed to go to the rear for an extensive refit. The 
petition was curious, since Buford's was the only disposable cavalry on the 
battlefield."

   Longacre than goes on to say: "Just as curiously, Pleasonton assented." 
and "Buford's decision to leave Gettysburg was questioned by his own 
troops." and then "Pleasonton deserves as much blame as Buford for the 
withdrawal."

    Rather than placing most of the blame on Pleasonton, is it perhaps 
fairer to assign a hefty share on Buford's shoulders for leaving the left 
flank unmasked of cavalry? [I'd think that Pleasonton also had quite a lot 
on his mind with his troops spread out over southern PA and  northern MD?]
          Alan

   The withdraw of Buford's cavalry brigades from the AOP's left flank on 
the morning of July 2 has always been a mystery to me. From all I read, both 
Devin's and Gamble's brigades were still capable of combat and surely could 
have conducted effective screening and scouting operations on the army's 
flank.
    Why Buford asked to be withdrawn at such a critical time, IMHO, remains 
inexplicable. However, that Pleasanton granted the request is more 
understandable. Buford was a veteran division commander and one of the most 
combative officers in the army, thus when such a request came to the corps 
commander it is not without reason that Pleasanton would take him at his 
word and grant permission. (To the group's cavalry experts: Is there a 
record of the two meeting or of Pleasanton actually inspecting the condition 
of Buford's brigades to evaluate their combat worthiness?)
   However, even in granting Buford's request, Pleasanton should have 
arranged for a screening force (perhaps a squadron or even a regiment) to 
remain on the flank until fresh cavalry could be brought up after the rest 
of Devin's and Gamble's brigades were withdrawn. That would have been a 
sound and prudent military move.
  Also, does anyone know if Sickles or Hancock were formally informed of the 
removal of the flank-covering cavalry or did they suddenly discover that the 
horsesoldiers had vanished and, if so, what, if any, did that fact play in 
Sickles'  decision to eventually move forward to the Emmittsburg Road?
   With regards,
     Chet