GDG- Butterfield

Tom Ryan pennmardel at mchsi.com
Tue Jul 24 11:31:06 CDT 2007


<<I wonder if Butterfield, having in effect been somewhat complicit in
Hooker's disregard of BMI numbers he either did or should really have known
to be reliable, found himself in something of an ethical bind once Meade
took command.  It would have been very difficult for him, as an officer, to
admit to deliberately "cooking the books" to abet Hooker's political
machinations with the Administration.  He may have felt compelled to hold to
the same line with Meade, in downplaying the BMI's counts.>>

Jim,

	I agree that that was probably the case as far as Butterfield was
concerned.  Since he still was very much Hooker's man, so to speak, after
Meade took over, it does not seem likely that he would have compromised
Hooker's previous position regarding strength figures.


<<Of course, overestimation of ANV strenght was such an ingrained habit in
the AOP, Patrick's reservations notwithstanding, that Meade himself may have
been so predisposed to accept inflated strength estimates for the ANV, that
it didn't take all that much extra convincing on Butterfield's part.>>

	This is an interesting as well as curious point as far as the AoP is
concerned.  It is unclear how much intelligence produced by the BMI was
disseminated to subordinate commanders by Hooker and Meade.  Since almost
all of the corps commanders who are on record concurred with the opinion
that the ANV was as strong if not stronger than the AoP, it seems that
little if any intelligence was trickling down to them.  Instead they must
have relied on the opinions of their two army commanders for their
(erroneous) information.

Tom



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