GDG- Buford's departure on July 2

[Tom Ryan]

<<Tom - a question - do you, or anyone out there, think that
Butterfield's hostility to Meade (He was Hooker's guy after all)
contributed to a less than stellar performance by him at Gettysburg?>>

Laurie,

	There were a couple of instances that could be cited in which Butterfield
did not serve Meade as well as he could.  One area in particular was the
handling and interpretation of intelligence reports coming to headquarters
from Col. George Sharpe's Bureau of Military Information, the AoP
intelligence staff.

	When General Hooker set up the BMI in early 1863, he made Butterfield the
conduit or go-between for information from Sharpe to Hooker, and this
practice continued when Meade took over.  Butterfield was fully
knowledgeable of the methods employed by the BMI to collect, distill and
interpret information about the enemy's strength, intentions and
disposition.  He also knew that the BMI had developed methods to determine
with a high degree of accuracy the order of battle of the Army of Northern
Virginia.

	However, at Gettysburg, Butterfield seemed to be either distracted when it
came to intelligence reports, or he was deliberately misinterpreting them.
One example was when the BMI reported on July 2 that all three divisions of
Ewell's corps were on the field.  The BMI knew this because prisoners had
been taken from the three divisions.  The next morning, Butterfield sent a
note to Sharpe asking whether he was certain that only two of Ewell's
divisions were on the field.  In response, and evidently to make certain
there was no misunderstanding this time, Sharpe sent a full OB of Ewell's
corps, listing all three divisions and each brigade in these divisions
complete with the name of the commanders and the strength of each unit.

	The night before, Sharpe had told Butterfield and Meade that Lee had used
up every brigade in his army during the first two days of battle with the
exception of the brigades in Pickett's division.  Sharpe knew this, he said,
because the BMI had interrogated prisoners from every other brigade in the
ANV.  So this should have been further evidence regarding the accuracy of
the figures being passed to AoP headquarters.

	As we know, Meade was under the impression that Lee's army was as strong if
not stronger than the AoP.  Yet the BMI had reported sufficient information
for Butterfield and Meade to realize that Lee's army was weaker than was
believed.  But Butterfield evidently made no effort to change Meade's mind
on this issue.  Butterfield, of all people, should have accepted the
intelligence as accurate based on the solid evidence produced by the BMI.

	Yet when Butterfield testified before the Joint Congressional Committee in
early 1864 about the Battle of Gettysburg, he told them that Lee's army was
equally as strong as the AoP.  It is not clear why he would do this,
however, just as during the battle itself, he was not providing good service
to Meade.

	As we know, Butterfield was a hostile witness regarding Meade's performance
furing the Battle of Gettysburg, and went out of his way to make himself
available for this purpose.

	One other instance of less than stellar performance was when Butterfield
prematurely issued orders for a number of the AoP corps to begin to pursue
Lee's army after the Battle of Gettysburg.  Meade had instructed him not to
do so without first getting the specific o.k, from Meade.  This blunder led
to Butterfield's ultimate dismissal from the AoP.

Tom