GDG- Buford's departure on July 2

[Eric J. Wittenberg]

Thanks for the kind words, Tom.  I'm really pleased to hear that you 
enjoyed the article.  I agree with your assessments right down the line; we 
really take Pleasonton to task in our study of the retreat for failing to 
concentrate and use his cavalry effectively.  It was a very poor use of his 
mounted arm, and it allowed an opportunity to cut Lee off before reaching 
the Potomac and forcing him to fight in the vicinity of Smithsburg to slip 
through his fingers.

Eric

At 02:46 PM 7/21/2007, you wrote:
>Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
>Having finished reading Eric Wittenberg's article "The Truth About the
>Withdrawal of Brig. Gen. John Buford's Cavalry, July 2, 1863" in the latest
>issue of Gettysburg Magazine, I congratulate Eric for some fine sleuthing
>and a well-argued commentary on the responsibility for the untimely
>withdrawal of Buford's two brigades from Gettysburg on July 2.
>
>To Eric's conclusion that the ultimate responsibility must lie with Meade,
>but the basic blunder was committed by Pleasonton, I would add that chief of
>staff Butterfield should shoulder some of the blame as well.  It is duty of
>the COS to know the whereabouts of the various units of the army, and
>Butterfield should have been aware that both Gregg and Kilpatrick's
>divisions had still not reached the battlefield at the time that Meade
>issued orders through Butterfield to send Buford's brigades to Taneytown and
>Westminster.
>
>Butterfield should have raised the red flag prior to Meade approving this
>move, since Meade evidently understood that there were cavalry units
>available to replace Buford on the left.
>
>While not letting Butterfield off the hook, Pleasonton must bear the primary
>burden for this seeming total lack of awareness of the vulnerability he was
>creating by sending his only cavalry resources away from the battlefield
>that had already been engaged in fighting.
>
>Given Pleasonton's performance since the beginning of the campaign, hwoever,
>this should not have been surprising.  Mistakes and blunders prevailed at:
>
>Brandy Station for not ensuring that his entire force got across the river
>in the early morning, and not forcing the exposure of the ANV infantry
>sufficiently to report its presence to General Hooker.
>
>The Blue Ridge when Pleasonton did not follow Hooker's orders to scout all
>the way to the mountains, and, therefore, missed spotting Ewell's corps
>marching to the Valley on June 10-12.
>
>The Loudoun Valley when Pleasonton chose to fight battles rather than follow
>Hooker's orders to search out the location of Lee's army in the Valley.
>
>In Northern Virginia when Pleasonton failed to follow orders from
>headquarters to investigate an attack against Hancock's flank by reportedly
>some 6,000 Rebel cavalry (the beginning of Stuart's ride).
>
>In Maryland when Pleasonton failed to give credence to citizen reports that
>Rebel cavalry had arrived in Westminster.  Pleasonton insisted that the
>citizens had misidentified Union cav for Confederates.  This was when Stuart
>had arrived in Westminster with three brigades.
>
>Also, the AoP cavalry's performance during the pursuit of Lee following the
>Battle of Gettysburg was less than stellar.  But I think that situation
>awaits a more indepth study to assess who, if anyone, was actually managing
>the cavalry during this period.  Meade and Pleasonton may have to share the
>blame during this time period.
>
>Tom
>
> 
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Eric J. Wittenberg
KRUPMAN, GOLDEN, MEIZLISH,
MARKS & WITTENBERG, LLP
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
923 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio  43205
614.258.1983
Fax: 614.253.5071
eric at kgmmw.com

www.kgmmw.com