GDG- Buford's departure on July 2

[Tom Ryan]

Having finished reading Eric Wittenberg's article "The Truth About the
Withdrawal of Brig. Gen. John Buford's Cavalry, July 2, 1863" in the latest
issue of Gettysburg Magazine, I congratulate Eric for some fine sleuthing
and a well-argued commentary on the responsibility for the untimely
withdrawal of Buford's two brigades from Gettysburg on July 2.

To Eric's conclusion that the ultimate responsibility must lie with Meade,
but the basic blunder was committed by Pleasonton, I would add that chief of
staff Butterfield should shoulder some of the blame as well.  It is duty of
the COS to know the whereabouts of the various units of the army, and
Butterfield should have been aware that both Gregg and Kilpatrick's
divisions had still not reached the battlefield at the time that Meade
issued orders through Butterfield to send Buford's brigades to Taneytown and
Westminster.

Butterfield should have raised the red flag prior to Meade approving this
move, since Meade evidently understood that there were cavalry units
available to replace Buford on the left.

While not letting Butterfield off the hook, Pleasonton must bear the primary
burden for this seeming total lack of awareness of the vulnerability he was
creating by sending his only cavalry resources away from the battlefield
that had already been engaged in fighting.

Given Pleasonton's performance since the beginning of the campaign, hwoever,
this should not have been surprising.  Mistakes and blunders prevailed at:

Brandy Station for not ensuring that his entire force got across the river
in the early morning, and not forcing the exposure of the ANV infantry
sufficiently to report its presence to General Hooker.

The Blue Ridge when Pleasonton did not follow Hooker's orders to scout all
the way to the mountains, and, therefore, missed spotting Ewell's corps
marching to the Valley on June 10-12.

The Loudoun Valley when Pleasonton chose to fight battles rather than follow
Hooker's orders to search out the location of Lee's army in the Valley.

In Northern Virginia when Pleasonton failed to follow orders from
headquarters to investigate an attack against Hancock's flank by reportedly
some 6,000 Rebel cavalry (the beginning of Stuart's ride).

In Maryland when Pleasonton failed to give credence to citizen reports that
Rebel cavalry had arrived in Westminster.  Pleasonton insisted that the
citizens had misidentified Union cav for Confederates.  This was when Stuart
had arrived in Westminster with three brigades.

Also, the AoP cavalry's performance during the pursuit of Lee following the
Battle of Gettysburg was less than stellar.  But I think that situation
awaits a more indepth study to assess who, if anyone, was actually managing
the cavalry during this period.  Meade and Pleasonton may have to share the
blame during this time period.

Tom