GDG- Re: John Bell Hood as commander

[Biggsk at aol.com]

Chet writes:

>>>>It seemed only appropriate that Hood be relieved of command,  after all 
at Franklin and Nashville he had effectively destroyed the Army of  Tennessee 
and had nothing left to command.>>>>
By this time he was the epitome of the Peter Principle in action.  Not  only 
did he show little tactical finesse in this campaign (and what he did show  
was due to the rampaging Forrest whose cavalry was like a panzer division  
beating the Union cavalry under James Wilson like a drum and also threatening to  
cut off, or actually cutting off, Union columns), but his horrible handling of  
the army's logistics trains meant that when Forrest DID cut off Schofield at  
Spring Hill, he had to fall back as his troopers were down to only a handful 
of  rounds per man!  Additionally, his artillery trains were also towards the  
rear of the columns.  His attack at Franklin was with two of his three  corps 
(although some more came later) and with 12 guns out of his army artillery  
in support.
 
There is simply no excuse for Nashville and that blame also lands at  
President Davis' feet.  He must have been on crack to think that, by this  stage of 
the war, with Sherman on his way to Savannah instead of continuing his  pursuit 
of Hood, that the Union didn't have enough manpower and quality generals  to 
defend Nashville.  Nashville, additionally, was heavily defended with a  ring 
of forts.  There was simply no way, at this stage of the war, for any  
attacking Confederate army in Tennessee to do anything of strategic value that  was 
going to alter the outcome of the war - the apologia on the Hood website  
notwithstanding.
 
Yet another Davis blunder and a lot of guys died.
 

>>>  Hood was an excellent brigade and division  commander with the ANV and 
reached his zenith of command ability at Gettysburg  and Chickamauga, but was 
the proverbial round peg in a square hole as a both a  corps and army 
commander. The latter is by far the most tragic for his  ineptness led to the needless 
slaughter of so many young  men.>>>>
His command of a corps in the Atlanta Campaign was decent actually.   He was 
not the guy that Joe Johnston wanted to command the corps - his choice  was 
Mansfield Lovell.  Steven Woodworth in his excellent study of the  Confederate 
command in the West, "Jefferson Davis And His Generals," argues that  because 
of the inept Leonidas Polk being not only the senior Lt. General in the  West 
but also a true Friend of Jeff's (as in Davis - Bragg was NOT an FOJ by the  
way - he just knew who the boss was), the good division commanders could not  
move up and get seasoning in the 1862-1863 campaigns so that when 1864 rolled  
around, Joe Johnston would have had better choices to command his  corps.
 
My scenario for Old Joe to face Sherman in 1864 was three infantry corps  led 
by William J. Hardee, Patrick Cleburne and A.P. Stewart, with his cavalry  
corps led by Forrest (swap Wheeler to Mississippi for Forrest's troopers).   
This would only have ahppened had Davis allowed Bragg to fire Polk after the KY  
Campaign of 1862.
 
Unlike the ANV, where Lee could hire and fire whom he pleased, the AOT  could 
never do that.  And that killed the army by sticking it with poor  choices 
for corps command.
 
Hood, while leading his corps in the Atlanta Campaign began the despicable  
back-stabbing of his commander Johnston by sending back-channel messages to  
Davis.  These messages were anti-Johnston (even though Old Joe put loads of  
trust in Hood), and were designed to set him up to be in line to replace  
Johnston should that happen.  Some of these messages contained outright  lies as 
shown by those written after Cassville, where Johnston, with Hood's and  Polk's 
agreement, fell back after the collapse of his failed attack the day  before.  
By the way, it was Hood's Corps that was to deliver the attack and  he fell 
back without orders when his rear division was struck by a lost Union  cavalry 
division (McCook's) as it marched to its place of attack.  It was a  beautiful 
plan and Schofield's army would have been eaten for lunch had Hood not  botched 
it.
 
Hood told Davis that the terrain was good and that he had voted to stay,  
when it was so-so and he voted for retreat.  It was only Hardee that voted  to 
stay and fight.
 
>>>>   The great difference between Lee and Hood as  army commanders is one 
of growth. Lee came to realize that the costly frontal  attacks of 1862 and 
1863 were worse than useless and a drain on irreplaceable  manpower so the highly 
skilled engineer became the general of the spade and the  turned earth and 
constructed fortifications that rivaled those seen on the  Western Front 50 
some years later. Hood never, or could not, comprehend how the  tactics had 
changed and during his tenure as army commander kept trying to  recreate those 
early war glory days in the East against veteran, hard-fighting  Union 
commanders in the West.>>>>



That is the typical rap against Hood, but it is not accurate.  In the  
Atlanta Campaign, two of his three attacks around the city were actually  flanking 
attacks based on, as he stated in his memoirs, the "great Lee-Jackson  plans of 
Chancellorsville."  Of course Hood was not at Chancellorsville,  but the 
plan, particularly for the Battle of Atlanta, was identical.

 
McPherson's Army of the Tennessee had, after crossing the Chattahoochee  
River, moved to the east side of Atlanta thus cutting the Georgia  Railroad.  This 
was one of Sherman's prime targets as it was on that very  line that 
Longstreet's Corps came into Atlanta in 1863.  Sherman's cavalry  had been doing a 
poor job of ripping up rail lines, and so, without telling  McPherson, he ordered 
Grenville Dodge's 16th Corps out to Stone Mountain to rip  them up.  Dodge 
was a railroad engineer who built them before the war and  would complete the 
line of the Union Pacific to California after it.   McPherson, feeling uneasy 
about his army's position east of the city, did a  personal recon and found his 
left flank in the air but anchored on the Bald Hill  (soon renamed Leggett's 
Hill for the stand his division made there - now the  intersection of Moreland 
Ave. and I-20) and countermanded Sherman's order to  Dodge, telling him to 
form his corps to the left of the hill in a refused flank  formation.  Sherman 
was furious.
 
At a similar time, troopers o Wheeler's cavalry also saw that McPherson's  
flank was in the air and informed Hood.  Hood them ordered Hardee's Corps  to do 
a 13 mile march through the city and then turn east and be in position to  
strike into the rear of the Federals by dawn.  The problem is, Hardee's  troops 
had been resisting McPherson's advance for a couple days, the last men  only 
being able to break off about midnight, and then they had to form columns  and 
do the march.  It would have been better to use Cheatham's Corps who  had more 
rest.  So off Hardee's men go, with a local guide to lead  them.  They get 
into position, Wheeler's cavalry forms to their right for  their strike on 
McPherson's trains in Decatur and to support the envelopment,  and, in an echelon 
formation, first Bate's, then Walker's, then Cleburne's  divisions, step off - 
but not at dawn, rather about noon. 
 
To their immediate surprise, where there should have been no Union infantry  
to their front (at least for Bate and Walker) there indeed was - the men of  
Sweeney's and Fuller's Divisions of Dodge's Corps!  So instead of being an  
enveloping attack, as planned, it became a frontal attack.  Walker was  killed 
right off and the attacks, though powerful, faced veteran tough troops  who 
would not yield.  Cleburne's 12:45 attack rolled up the Union lines to  the west 
supported by Cheatham's old division at 3:30 (he was temporary corps  
commander) until the resistance on top of Bald Hill finally stopped them.
 
Even with this, Hood came darn close to winning, and had he staged his  
attack differently, he would have crushed McPherson  (who was killed  anyway) and 
rolled up his army routing Sherman's move east of the city.   What did he do 
wrong?  When you are planning a flank or envelopment attack  with part of your 
army, the other part is supposed to keep the attention of the  enemy focused on 
them as Lee did while Jackson marched out.  What Hood did  was attack first 
with the flanking troops and then attack later with the troops  to the front - 
and when that attack began around 4 PM, it shattered the Union  line for the 
length of 6 brigades!
 
So who came to the Union rescue?  Not Sherman, as he wanted his old  army to 
fight and prove themselves to the other two armies of his command.   He did 
personally sight a number of Union guns to fire down Cheatham's   left flank.  
It was John Logan, 15th Corps commander, that rallied his  broken troops, and 
with Sweeney's Division now available after stopping Bate  earlier, 
counter-attacked and sealed the line after hard fighting.
 
So all things being even, had Cheatham attacked first, while Hardee was  
marching, he would have blown open the Union center, necessitating  reinforcements 
to seal the hole.  Taking the same troops from his left  flank, who were 
doing nothing, he would have weakened that part of his line so  that when Hardee's 
men came out of the woods, there would have been nothing to  stop Bate's 
Division from enveloping Fuller and start rolling up the  flanks.
 
Hood would have won one of the greatest battles of the war and possibly  
saved Atlanta.
 
But his only mistake here was that he did not lead off with Cheatham  instead 
of Hardee.  Otherwise is was a great plan and not a frontal assault  as he 
was accused.  As it was, this attack rocked Sherman on his heels and  he gave up 
any further operations on the east side of the city because of  it.
 
Hood's next fight was at Ezra Church west of the city and the plan was  
identical to this one.  The plan this time was to seize high ground with  S.D. 
Lee's Corps (coming over from Mississippi to relieve Cheatham - this was  Hood's 
old corps) and flank the Union lines with A.P. Stewart's Corps  (Polk's old 
corps).  The Yankees got the high ground first, Lee would not  wait for Stewart 
to come up and form to maneuver and flank, and the thing fell  apart.  This was 
not Hood's fault and it was not his plan to attack  frontally.
 
As for Peachtree Creek, Hood's first attack after getting command of the  
AOT, he used a modification of Johnston's plan for driving Thomas into the creek  
and back against the Chattahoochee River.  There was a gap in the Union  
lines between Thomas' left and McPherson's right and the plan was to get a  
division into this gap, turn them left and then start driving Thomas into the  creek 
and the river.  The plan was to catch Thomas while crossing the  creek, much 
like Johnston did at the Chickahominy River.  Johnston was  relieved by Davis, 
and despite Hood begging him to stay and fight the battle, he  left for 
Macon.  I highly suspect, but cannot prove, that Johnston found  out about Hood's 
back-channel messages and basically said, "well old boy, you  stabbed me in the 
back and lobbied the president for the job - now go do it on  your own!"
 
Hood slightly modified the attack by moving it further east, which gave  
Thomas time to get more men across the creek and entrench them.  When the  attack 
came off, Bate's Division found the gap but got lost and thus did  not make 
the left turn.  Walker's Division turned right instead of left,  and the rest of 
the attacks were frontal supporting assaults, but those did some  real damage 
before being stopped.   If there is blame at place in this  battle is could 
be on Hardee, who did not perform as corps commander very  well.
 
So I give Hood a pass here as he used basically Johnston's plan.  The  firing 
of him by Davis helped delay the attack for at least 2 days while Hood  
learned what he needed of his army's dispositions.
 
So, with regards to Atlanta, Hood did a fine job overall (with some  tactical 
mistakes as I have explained) in planning two attacks that were it use  
flanking/enveloping maneuvers as the basis of them (the first in the history of  
the AOT by the way) showing good tactical and strategic sophistication as a army 
 commander.
 
Jonesboro's first day, was a frontal assault designed to put "fight" back  
into his army.  By this time Atlanta was about cut off and Jonesboro  protected 
the last rail lines into the city.  The Federals got to the high  ground 
before Hood did (he intended to get there first and entrench), so when he  found 
out that he had lost his footrace, he decided to put his head down and  just go.
 
In this attack only, does Hood show sheer folly as a commander - the same  
folly he would show in Tennessee three months later.
 
Hood is guilty as charged for his poor tactical actions in the Tennessee  
Campaign, but not for most of his handling of the battles for Atlanta.  
 
Greg Biggs