GDG- Re: CSA supply in 1863

[Biggsk at aol.com]

Margaret Blugh writes:


>>>The massive supply operation in early  1863 included  that 
most-misunderstood of campaigns, Longstreet's Suffolk expedition, whose  primary objective 
was not to take the Union-held town of Suffolk (if he could  manage to take it, 
great, but no additional resources would be given to him in  order to do it) 
but to be able to hold off Union forces in the area long  enough to collect 
supplies from the region and upper North Carolina (It also  meant that Lee 
wouldn't have to be concerned with supplying those two  divisions while they were 
gone.) It says a lot about the state of things that  two crack combat divisions 
of the ANV had to be diverted in order to do this  as the spring campaign 
season was beginning.>>>
 
A fine point indeed!  Couple this with what Goff wrote about it that  I have 
cited, and you see a somewhat rickety supply system at this time.  I  can go 
into a lot of details why this was, starting from Pres. Davis to his  SecWar of 
the time to some other things but I don't want to bog this down. 
 
While the CS supply system did indeed perform miracles and had very  talented 
men like Josiah Gorgas, it still had to be supplemented by battlefield  
captures, imports and impressments from its citizens.  One author has made  the 
argument, and I agree with him, that Confederate financial policy was to  blame.  
Hyper-inflation took its toll, killed civilian confidence in the  currency, 
forced up prices and that created hoarding, which in turn took off the  table 
valuable raw materials and even finished goods.  Hence the  Confederate policy 
of impressment and tax-in-kind (paying your taxes not with  currency but with 
goods valued usually below market prices).
 
I can add to that the lack of a railroad policy along the lines of what the  
North did - nationalize the railroads!  But a Southern revolution of a  
largely libertarian nature was just not going to go for that.  Because of  that lots 
of supplies did not get to where they were grown or made to where they  were 
needed.  Couple this with the habit of some CS officers hoarding rail  cars 
and not offloading them so they can then be reused to carry more supplies,  and 
this then starts to spiral out of control and cutting off supplies on its  own.
 
The CSA made more than enough powder (the massive Augusta Powder Works was  
supremely efficient), not quite enough guns or bullets (lead was always in 
short  supply as the South had few good lead mines), more than enough uniforms and 
 more than enough food, particularly in the Deep South which was its largest 
food  growing source anyway.  By 1864, Lee's army was crossing departmental 
lines  and getting virtually all of its food from Georgia and Alabama, forcing 
the Army  of Tennessee to get its food further west along the Tombigbee River 
on the  Alabama-Mississippi state line.  But it was the lack of a rail policy 
and  that system's near collapse due to it being worn out by excessive use (and 
a  lack of iron making capacity to roll more replacement rails), that would 
cripple  the Confederacy over time.
 
Goff suggested in his book that all the Confederates could really afford to  
do, from a pure supply situation, was to remain totally defensive 
strategically  and only do small tactical counter-punches.  In retrospect, I think he was  
correct.
 
Greg Biggs