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[Tom Ryan]

Hi Alan,

	Good questions.  Let me take a crack at both.

<<Two questions, firstly: assuming that you are right in that Meade should
have known he had enough troops to attack Lee and finish thing in this
campaign:

(1) When is the earliest that you believe Meade could have created such
a plan, assembled the necessary forces, and start the assault? [July 3?
July 4? ...]>>

	A good commander who knows the enemy is going to attack should plan how and
when to counterattack beforehand (with a couple of possible scenarios).  If
that has not happened, then the best time to counterattack is immediately
after the repulse and follow the retreating enemy back to their positions --
which provides cover for the counterattack.

	Beyond that, there is no optimum time to attack or counterattack depending
on the label you choose at a later time.  You just have to plan it and do
it.  But do something.  You just cannot sit there and hope for the best.  In
other words, take a page from Grant's later campaigns.

(2) If it were before Lee left the G'burg area - say, on 7/3 or 7/4 - do
you have a specific plan that Meade might have chosen? (For example, it
would not seem to me to make sense to do a reverse Lee, and attack from
Cemetery Ridge towards Seminary Ridge directly.)

	The above answer applies here.  However, I would like to address what Meade
should have done to prevent Lee from escaping.  He could have blocked Lee's
withdrawal through Monterey Pass by ordering Kilpatrick's reinformced
cavalry division to prevent Lee's army from getting through.  Meade would
have had to support K. with one or two brigades of infantry to plug up that
route.  Remember that Lee had sent a 20-mile long wagon train to precede his
army through the pass, and a Union force should have been able to plug that
bottleneck rather easily.

However, Meade gave no such instructions to his cavalry.  Just as at
Gettysburg, Meade chose to wait and see what Lee was going to do.  That was
his mistake.  Once Lee got through the mountains, Meade would have never
been able to catch up except for the unusual circumstance of high water at
the river.  We know what happened at Williamsport.  The AoP command
frittered away their opportunity to attack and destroy Lee's army.

A close analysis of Meade's mindset, which I have done, during this
timeframe reveals a great deal of ambilvalence on Meade's part.  He never
was able to rectify Lincoln's desire for him to destroy Lee's army with his
other sensibilities -- i.e., his desire first to rest his army, and his fear
of having his victory at Gettysburg overshadowed by a potential loss to Lee
somewhere along the pursuit/retreat route.  Meade did not have the killer
instinct that is required to finish off a wounded animal.  Some have argued
that the ANV was still a force to be reckoned with, and to a certain extent
it was.  Yet most of the advantanges were in Meade's favor.  Specifically,
he had a much larger army, he had a means of resupply, he was fighting in
friendly territory (relatively speaking), and his troops were chomping at
the bit to finish off the enemy.  Conversely, Lee and what was left of his
army were at least partially demoralized, they were back pedaling, their
ammunition was seriourly depleted, they had no lines of communication, and
therefore no means of resupply or reinforcement.

Meade should have ordered French's division at Frederick to block the
crossings at the river in case Lee got through the mountains, and that would
have cut off the ammo supply train that was coming up from Winchester.

If any or all of those things happen, there is no way that I can see Lee
getting away safely.  As a matter of fact, given his poor physical condition
and exhaustion from the tremendous exertion required to fight the battle and
orchestrate the retreat, it would not surprise me to see Lee succumb to near
complete physical debilitation if confronted seriously at Monterey Pass or
at Williamsport and have to go through another several days of demanding
pressure that always accompanies intense combat.

	The mistake Meade and his commanders made, I believe, is that they saw the
Battle of Gettysburg as a finite event, when it was actually one part of a
much broader campaign.  It just does not pay to win the battle, and lose the
campaign.

Regards, Tom

Thanks,
Alan

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