GDG- Meade's Leadership

[John Baniszewski]

SNIP
   
  Continuing on the theme of Meade's leadership, I would add another critical aspect that has been particularly apprarent to me, and I wonder what others think about this.  Meade had a blind eye for intelligence in many respects.

  UNSNIP
   
  I believe this judgment is too harsh.  Those of us who live in 2006 have the benefit of knowing that the BMI estimates were more correct than other estimates being provided to Meade.  Upon taking command three days before the battle, Meade was faced with multiple information sources concerning a critically important factor (enemy strength).  Some of these estimates say 100,000.  How does Meade know that the BMI estimate is the most accurate?  The BMI was not a long-established organization, it was less than six months old.  The only battle fought prior to Gettysburg during which the BMI existed was Chancellorsville, a Union fiasco.  It would be analagous today to a politician trying to make a decision as to where to spend campaign funds, when some polls say he is ten points ahead, and other polls say he is ten points behind.  The BMI did not have enough of a track record at that time to be considered as the sole accurate source of information.
   
  I believe you overstate the case that the AOP could assume that information from captured prisoners is reliable.  Some prisoners were non-willing soldiers who were Union sympathers, and would probably tell the truth.  Some would be avid Rebels and inclined to lie, or even encouraged to lie.  I do not have the exact reference, but there is a report in the OR dated around July 11 that says something like "a captured prisoner reports that a force commanded by Beuaregard is across the Potomac".  The report was not believed by the AOP commanders, but nevertheless it was a prisoner who made that statement.
   
  One aspect of Meade that is absolutely clear is that he was a strong believer in the concept of risk analysis.  In conducting risk analysis, one has to assess the probability of things happening, based on whatever information is available.  When given conflicting information, or inadequate information, the normal practice is to assume a conservative (bad-case) scenario.  The benefit of doing this is that you have fewer failures.  The down side is that you take advantage of fewer opportunities, and may miss achieving a breakthrough.
   
  I speak as a NASA employee who deals routinely with risk management.  Have you ever wondered why so many Space Shuttle flights have delayed launches?  It is because the consequences of a failure are so great, NASA takes a conservative approach to risk, and small anomalies that occur during a count-down will often lead to a decision to delay.  The Challenger accident is a case in which NASA was not its usual conservative self, and that led to disaster. 
   
  In terms of being a risk taker, for Civil War generals Meade was a moderate.  Many of the decisions he made from June 28 through July 3 involved significant risk.  After July 3, he was less willing to take risk.  Grant, Lee, and Sherman were greater (and usually successful) risk takers - (Grant's Vicksburg campaign, Sherman's march through Georgia, Lee at Chancellorsville).  Halleck and McClellan were highly risk averse (Halleck's Corinth campaign, McClellan on the Peninsula).  But there are as many cases where taking a high risk led to failure, as there are leading to success (such as Cold Harbor).
   
  I disagree that he had a "blind eye" toward intelligence - I feel it is too strong of a characterization.  I would describe him as being conservative (or "risk-averse) when it came to making choices between conflicting pieces of intelligence, and that he was generally inclined to assume that his risks were higher, rather than lower.
   
  John Baniszewski
   
   

 
---------------------------------
Need a quick answer? Get one in minutes from people who know. Ask your question on Yahoo! Answers.