GDG- Re: Turning Point?

[Biggsk at aol.com]

Hello,

Dave Schultz asks some interesting stuff in his post.
 
Being the supply disciple of Richard Goff's book "Confederate Supply," one  
can argue, as indeed he did, that such an offensive into Pennsylvania (actually 
 a raid on a very large scale) was even needed?
 
I argue that it was not and based on the results, we can see that perhaps  
this is correct.  Lee expended a huge amount of carefully hoarded supplies  and 
took significant casualties doing so, and without a favorable outcome for  his 
cause save the Virginia farmers got some reprieve.
 
Much of what had been planned could have been done with a smaller raiding  
force - say a corps with attached cavalry for some good ole' cattle  rustlin'.  
This might actually have given Lee a bigger chance to do  something against 
the AOP, for they would have had to react to this smaller raid  and possibly 
left themselves open to a good strike by Lee on ground of his  choosing rather 
than their choosing.
 
I have always wondered why Lee abandoned that which had worked so well for  
his army so far in the war by going over to a strictly offensive plan rather  
than making the enemy come to him and fight on his terms?  The Peninsula is  an 
anomaly here as those attacks were needed to drive McClellan from the  
Richmond front, even if at Malvern Hill Lee got sucked into the point of  
diminishing returns.
 
Bragg actually showed how it should have been done with the Kentucky  
Campaign of 1862, which was coupled with an all-points Confederate offensive  from 
the Trans-Miss to Virginia - and thus the real high water mark of the  
Confederacy.  Maneuver, fight battles where you wish, win them all  (Munfordville, 
Perryville and Richmond), draw off huge Federal reinforcements  thus forcing the 
delay of the first Vicksburg campaign and take the war back  towards the Ohio 
River and liberate much of Tennessee that had fallen with the  collapse at Ft. 
Donelson.  Bragg's campaign was brilliant for the most part  - and he got more 
done with it than Lee did going into Maryland in the same time  frame.
 
The main difference here when compared to Lee's 1863 raid, was that Lee  
fought where Meade wanted to fight - not where he would have chosen most  likely.
 
Secondly, had I been Lee and gone on this campaign, after smashing a couple  
Union corps on the first day, I would have fallen back towards Cashtown and  
built a powerful line there - and wait for Meade to come and move me off of it, 
 which he would have had to do with Lincoln beating down on him.
 
But ultimately, the argument is was this raid into Pennsylvania even needed  
in the first place?
 
Greg Biggs