GDG- doubleday

[Chet Diestel]

Esteemed GDG Member James Cameron Contributes:

    1. There are a couple of often repeated anecdotes of his ordering his 
arriving troops into battle, but the early part of the action is dominated 
byReynolds and his death.  After that, most of the attention given the Union 
command seems to shift to Howard.  This isn't, of course, surprising, given 
that Howard was in command of the field after Reynolds was killed, but
it does tend to take the spotlight off Doubleday.

   I am fairly sure that Howard gave no orders to Doubleday for six hours.
      What do you know?
   It took Howard a long time to actually ride over to the 1st Corps line 
and see Doubleday in person, but the two were in communication before that, 
and Doubleday does indicate receiving orders from Howard.

    2.  Early reports from the field, from both Buford and Hancock, tended 
to confirm his already low opinion of Doubleday, and he lost no time acting 
to replace him.

  Can you help me find these two reports "from both Buford and Hancock"?
     Thanks very much for your interest.
    Buford's message that I was referring to was actually to Pleasonton, not 
Meade, although I think it's reasonable to assume that Meade would have been 
informed of its contents.  This was the 3:20 pm message in which he wrote 
"In my opinion, there seems to be no directing person."  He appended a P.S., 
"We need help now."
     This message is commonly taken as more a criticism of Howard's command 
of the field than of Doubleday, and perhaps that's how Buford intended it. 
But with Doubleday the other Corps commander on the scene, I could easily 
see Meade viewing this as critical of him as well.  Just my opinion, though.
   (And the thought just occurred to me - which I hesitate to push too far, 
because there's really nothing concrete to base it on - that I suppose this 
could even be construed as critical of Slocum for not coming up in person to 
assume command.)

    The Hancock report I'm referring to is his 5:25 pm message to Meade from 
the field, which included the comment that "Howard says that Doubleday's 
command gave way."  And Howard himself sent Meade a 5:00 PM message which 
while not  overtly critical of Doubleday, gave the impression that the 1st 
Corps was forced to retire, as opposed to the 11th Corps being ordered back.

   None of these messages were the sort of thing that was going to boost 
Meade's confidence in Doubleday.  Taken as a whole, they were all he needed 
to pull the trigger on replacing him.

        Jim Cameron

   The decision to remove Doubleday had roots that ran far deeper and with a 
history extending far past his actions (or inaction), real or imagined, on 
one hot July day on a Pennsylvania battlefield. Part of it certainly 
involves the pro-McClellan and anti-McClellan fractions that still held sway 
over certain members of the AOP high command and would not actively settle 
down until the arrival of Grant the following year.
  Indeed, the very scene that greeted Hancock and then Meade should have 
worked against the removal of Doubleday, messages (with pointed negative 
remarks, intended or not, aimed at Doubleday) aside. Once upon the field, it 
should have been obvious to Hancock and later Meade that the I Corps units, 
although battered, were still combat worthy with virtually all its artillery 
intact, repositioned and ready on Cemetery Hill etc. --- all signs of a more 
or less orderly retreat as opposed to the XI Corps in which both Barlow's 
and Schurz's divisions had been obviously routed from their portion of the 
battlefield and whose commanders were desperately trying to rally the men, 
sort out what was left of the commands and make them combat worthy once 
again.
    One other thing on the removal of Doubleday --- it would have been one 
thing if he had been replaced by a dynamic and aggressive young division 
commander --- or even if Meade had placed Warren in command --- but John 
Newton? On his worse day, Doubleday could have equaled if not outperformed 
his replacement and Abner was coming off one of the best days of tactical 
fighting that any general on either side had during the war.
   With regard,
      Chet