GDG- Re: troops from the west

Margaret D. Blough mdblough1 at comcast.net
Sat Feb 3 05:23:02 CST 2007


Greg,

>>Intelligence can be either excellent or faulty - but the trick it how to  
properly interpret what you get.
 
Greg Biggs<<

That includes having an open mind and not letting one distort the intelligence to fit one's assumptions and/or simply rejecting any intelligence that questions or undermines those assumptions.  Pope at Second Manassas is a prime example of someone who had a fixed and unalterable view of the situation and any intelligence to the contrary was wasted on him.

Regards,

Margaret
                   
                   


-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: Biggsk at aol.com 

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes: 
> 
> 
> Bob: 
> 
> >>>>During the start up of the Peninsula Campaign, McClellan reported that 
> Beauregard and the western army was in Richmond. >>>> 
> 
> A similar report finally got Henry Halleck of his large posterior ordering 
> Grant to move on Henry-Donelson. 
> The papers stated that Beauregard was coming West to command with AS 
> Johnston - true. They also said he was bringing 15 regiments with him - false. 
> The 
> latter part got Halleck to FINALLY unleash Grant. 
> 
> Picture this in January, 1862. We have George McClellan, uber-commander, 
> then Don Carlos Buell, Dept. of the Ohio commander in Louisville and Halleck, 
> Dept of the Missouri commander in St. Louis. None of these men are fast 
> movers and none of them bear an aggressive bone in their bodies. On one day, 
> trying to figure out who who'll move first (recall that Buell and Halleck are 
> rivals here - whoever moves first and gets the glory will hold up well in 
> Lincoln's eyes), these three men exchanged 23 telegrams!!!!!!! 
> 
> And after that, everyone sat where they were - until the newspaper report. 
> 
> If Lincoln wasn't drinking scotch by this time, he should have been with 
> these three guys. 
> 
> My favorite line about Halleck comes from a Union officer - "he could not 
> command one army in the field, so they sent him to Washington to command them 
> all!" The "one army" part comes from his Jominian Corinth campaign - 30 days 
> or so to move 30 miles. 
> 
> 
> 
> >>>>One of the difficulties in warfare is evaluating intelligence. Given the 
> more recent foul-ups in that regard, we should not be too critical of Civil 
> War mistakes!>>>> 
> 
> 
> Let's see - it is Winter, one of the coldest in European history. Intel 
> report after report tells of German tanks and fresh troops across the lines in 
> huge numbers. Our side holds the area with a handful of battered or green 
> divisions. Then the Battle of the Bulge. 
> 
> Or this one - Dutch underground tells story after story of an SS panzer 
> corps having moved into the area to refit. Allied recon flights show the same 
> thing - parked right where a British airborne division was going to be dropped! 
> It was not only a bridge too far - it was a plan too stupid! 
> 
> Intelligence can be either excellent or faulty - but the trick it how to 
> properly interpret what you get. 
> 
> Greg Biggs 
> 
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