GDG- Re: troops from the west
Margaret D. Blough
mdblough1 at comcast.net
Sat Feb 3 05:23:02 CST 2007
Greg,
>>Intelligence can be either excellent or faulty - but the trick it how to
properly interpret what you get.
Greg Biggs<<
That includes having an open mind and not letting one distort the intelligence to fit one's assumptions and/or simply rejecting any intelligence that questions or undermines those assumptions. Pope at Second Manassas is a prime example of someone who had a fixed and unalterable view of the situation and any intelligence to the contrary was wasted on him.
Regards,
Margaret
-------------- Original message --------------
From: Biggsk at aol.com
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> Bob:
>
> >>>>During the start up of the Peninsula Campaign, McClellan reported that
> Beauregard and the western army was in Richmond. >>>>
>
> A similar report finally got Henry Halleck of his large posterior ordering
> Grant to move on Henry-Donelson.
> The papers stated that Beauregard was coming West to command with AS
> Johnston - true. They also said he was bringing 15 regiments with him - false.
> The
> latter part got Halleck to FINALLY unleash Grant.
>
> Picture this in January, 1862. We have George McClellan, uber-commander,
> then Don Carlos Buell, Dept. of the Ohio commander in Louisville and Halleck,
> Dept of the Missouri commander in St. Louis. None of these men are fast
> movers and none of them bear an aggressive bone in their bodies. On one day,
> trying to figure out who who'll move first (recall that Buell and Halleck are
> rivals here - whoever moves first and gets the glory will hold up well in
> Lincoln's eyes), these three men exchanged 23 telegrams!!!!!!!
>
> And after that, everyone sat where they were - until the newspaper report.
>
> If Lincoln wasn't drinking scotch by this time, he should have been with
> these three guys.
>
> My favorite line about Halleck comes from a Union officer - "he could not
> command one army in the field, so they sent him to Washington to command them
> all!" The "one army" part comes from his Jominian Corinth campaign - 30 days
> or so to move 30 miles.
>
>
>
> >>>>One of the difficulties in warfare is evaluating intelligence. Given the
> more recent foul-ups in that regard, we should not be too critical of Civil
> War mistakes!>>>>
>
>
> Let's see - it is Winter, one of the coldest in European history. Intel
> report after report tells of German tanks and fresh troops across the lines in
> huge numbers. Our side holds the area with a handful of battered or green
> divisions. Then the Battle of the Bulge.
>
> Or this one - Dutch underground tells story after story of an SS panzer
> corps having moved into the area to refit. Allied recon flights show the same
> thing - parked right where a British airborne division was going to be dropped!
> It was not only a bridge too far - it was a plan too stupid!
>
> Intelligence can be either excellent or faulty - but the trick it how to
> properly interpret what you get.
>
> Greg Biggs
>
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