GDG- Re: the politics of 1864

[Biggsk at aol.com]

Tom and Laurie,
 
I agree that it does not matter if the war is domestic or overseas - the  
main weakness of a republic at war is the support of its people no matter where  
that war is fought.  Northern cities were not being laid waste in the Civil  
War - only those in that "foreign land."  So that was not a factor at all  for 
the Union public to worry about.  Thus, Vietnam, and even the  Napoleonic 
Wars, offer case examples worthy of comparison to the Union public of  1864.
 
Lee stated clearly in 1864 that the South's best hope was to, "resist  
manfully."  What he meant by this was to try and make it so bloody for the  Union 
that there was a decent chance for them stopping the war.  One can  certainly 
make the case for this same strategy in 1863.  North Vietnamese  Gen. Giap, 
whose book I own and have read, also used the same strategy, and he  based it on 
that of George Washington in actuality.  Keep the army in the  field even if 
you get beat time and again.  Sooner or later, the public  supporting the other 
side will wear out.  It worked for Washington.
 
I heard a report recently about the Paris peace talks after the Linebacker  
II B-52 raids over North Vietnam, where the NVA's supply line got chopped to  
bits thus forcing them back to the peace table.  It stated that the North  
Vietnamese came in fully expecting the US envoys to demand their  surrender.  But 
what kept them going was two-fold:  first, the antiwar  faction in the USA was 
getting larger and more of the media was against  it.  Secondly, the envoys 
did not demand surrender; only a negotiated  end.
 
That was when the North Vietnamese knew they could win the political  victory 
once and for all, despite the hammering of the bomber raids.  They  knew from 
the second course that our side had no intention of really  winning.
 
In 1813, when Napoleon was fighting for his life after the disaster of  
Russia the year before, he was able to, through super-human ability seemingly,  
raise a new army to fight.  He would win some battles and not be able to  make 
anything of them due to lack of cavalry (which he feared would be a huge  
problem - and it was) to pursue the losers with.  But so long as he won  battles, 
the war-weary French people would hang on even after fighting wars for  20 years 
so far.  Thus, Napoleon knew that for him to remain where he was,  he had to 
win to keep his people's support.  He may have been emperor, but  there was a 
growing royalist and anti-Napoleon faction in France, and many were  just 
tired of war.
 
Then came Leipzig, the largest battle of the 19th Century, and Napoleon  
lost.  From there it was all downhill, with a few flourishes of hope, but  not 
nearly enough, so that in 1814, the Allies invaded France in great strength  and 
he was forced to abdicate.  When he came back from Elba, the  French people, 
though mostly happy to have him back over the Bourbons, still  shackled him 
with some constraints, so that when he lost at Waterloo, the people  were just 
not willing to go through the 1814 fighting in France again.
 
In both examples, one can find events of military history where the  
political side was lost (or won) based almost entirely on the support of folks  at 
home, and that this is indeed tied to military victories in some cases to  keep 
that support.  The longer a war goes on, the less the support over  time.  Even 
the ancient Greeks knew this and their Peloponnesian War is  also worthy of 
study along these lines.
 
Therefore, despite some evidence to the contrary, I still think that had  
Atlanta held, Mobile been a CS victory and maybe even Early pulling it off in  
the Valley, Lincoln was in deep trouble in November.  Add into this the  growing 
casualties and the public complaining to Congress, and then Congress  
complaining to Lincoln, and you have one bad scenario that could well have  happened.
 
But to me, the ultimate proof is that Lincoln, manic depressive or not (too  
many Velvet Underground records perhaps?) , STILL, thought he was toast - and  
that carries a lot of weight I think.  He was the one up for re-election;  no 
one else!
 
As a related issue, where I used to live in Ohio, a small town, their  
newspaper predates the Civil War and it is still owned by the same family.   The 
paper was anti-Lincoln in 1860 and even more so in 1864 - and the casualty  lists 
were one of their reasons.
 
Greg Biggs