GDG- Three Lines, Two Lines

Batrinque at aol.com Batrinque at aol.com
Sun Aug 26 21:23:27 CDT 2007


 
 
There is one  matter in particular I would like to bring up in this forum to 
seek the opinions  of this most informed and, well, opinionated group.  I 
speak of the lingering question of  what formation was used by Pettigrew's 
division (originally, Heth’s Division)  during the attack on July 3.  George  
Stewart's classic "Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at  
Gettysburg, July 3, 1863" put forth the contention that an unusual double line  
formation was used by Pettigrew’s division, four brigades deployed side by side,  but 
with each regiment divided in two, one half of the regiment in line behind  
the other half.  Trimble’s command  (originally, Pender’s division) was 
deployed in a single line of battle behind  Pettigrew, making the attacking column 
on the Confederate left three lines  deep. 
Stewart based his idea of  Pettigrew’s formation upon the official reports 
written by Lee and Longstreet  after the battle.  Lee referred to  “the column 
of attack, consisting of Pickett’s and Heth’s divisions in two lines  … Heth’
s was supported by Lane’s and Scales’ brigades [Trimble’s  division].”  
Longstreet was  explicit: “Heth’s division … was arranged in two lines, and these 
were supported  by part of Major-General Pender’s division.” 
Earl J Hess in "Pickett's Charge  -- The Last Attack" concludes that Stewart 
erred in depicting Pettigrew’s  division as being deployed in two lines.  He 
states that “there is no evidence from any survivor of the division’s  attack 
to indicate that this rather unorthodox formation was adopted.”  (Similarly, 
in a 1998 “North &  South” article, “Lee’s Gallant 6000?”, John Michael 
Priest also rejected the  Stewart scenario, noting, “Nowhere did I find records of 
the North Carolinians’  line being doubled up in this fashion.”)  Hess 
speculates that Lee and Longstreet somehow mistook Trimble’s  division as being the 
second line of Pettigrew’s division.  However, a Christian Commission worker  
with Confederate prisoners from Gettysburg reported a conversation with 
Captain  Benjamin Little of the 52nd North Carolina in which Little had stated  that 
his division had deployed with its “whole line two deep,” a somewhat  
ambiguous statement which might possibly refer to the standard two-rank line of  
battle formation. 
If we are to believe Stewart that  Pettigrew’s division was indeed deployed 
in a double line, it is necessary to  accept that no account survives from 
anyone in the division who subsequently  wrote about this atypical formation.  On 
the face of it, this would seem unlikely if there had indeed been two  lines.  
However, if we are instead  to agree with Hess’s conclusion about a single 
line of battle, then we must  believe that both the Army and the responsible 
Corps commanders were wrong about  such a fundamental point.  Neither  
alternative is attractive, but the hard truth is that one of the two choices  must be 
correct and one must be wrong.  Either we accept the positive statements of the 
two chief generals that  Pettigrew was deployed in two lines, or we place our 
faith in the reality of a  single line based on the lack of specific contrary 
evidence from the men and  officers of the division.   
But is there another source of  information that sheds light on the question? 
 Of course there is: Union soldiers who  observed the advance of Pettigrew’s 
division.  What did they say?  With a high degree of uniformity,  Northerners 
arrayed against Pettigrew’s attack reported seeing three lines of  advancing 
Confederate troops.   
General Alexander Hays, commander  of the Union division defending the stone 
wall extending north from the angle  and directly in the path of Pettigrew’s 
attack, wrote in his official report  that “a heavy column of the enemy moved 
forward in three lines, preceded by a  strong line of skirmishers.” 
Captain George Bowen of the  12th New Jersey recorded in his diary that “we 
saw them advancing out  of the woods across the field, coming in three lines of 
battle.”  Captain Edward Stratton of the same  regiment wrote of the fate of 
the assaulting column: “The first line had been  annihilated; the second was 
retreating, all broken and battered, one half left  behind; the third falling 
back in good order.” 
Lieutenant Tully of Woodruff’s  Battery with Hays’s division stated, “I saw 
this mass of men, in three long  lines.” 
Private T. S. Potter of the  8th Ohio, out on the skirmish line to the left 
flank of the advancing  Confederate force, wrote that “the line was about one 
mile in length by three  lines of battle deep.” 
Captain Samuel Armstrong of the  125th New York, also on the Union skirmish 
line, said that “the first  Confederate line near his position was nearly all 
shot down or captured; the  second did not support the first efficiently; and 
the third did not get at all  into the thick of the fight.”  
Sergeant Benjamin Hirst of the  14th Connecticut wrote his wife two days 
after the battle that he had  seen “the Rebels in 3 lines of Battle moving to 
attact [sic] us” and in a later  letter he reiterated that the Confederates 
attackers were in “one, two, three  lines of Battle, stretched all along our Front 
with their Banners flying.” 
Is it possible that somehow these  Union observers were wrong about there 
being three advancing Confederate lines  of battle?  Could they, for example,  
have misidentified a leading line of skirmishers as being a “first” line of  
battle?  This doesn’t seem credible  since Alexander Hays in his report soon 
after the battle was careful to  distinguish between the three lines of battle he 
saw and the skirmishers ahead  of them.  Could the lagging elements  of 
Brokenbrough’s and Davis’s brigades on the left end of Pettigrew’s division  have 
been mistaken as a separate line of battle?  To me, this seems improbable 
because the  Union accounts appear to point towards three lines being actually 
behind one  another.  The most reasonable  interpretation of these Union reports 
is that there were indeed three successive  Confederate lines of battle 
advancing towards Cemetery Ridge north of the  Angle. 
This information from Hays’s  division support the validity of George Stewart’
s conclusion that Pettigrew had  deployed his division in a double line, 
followed by Trimble in a third line,  exactly what Robert E. Lee and James 
Longstreet stated in their official  reports.  The case may not be wholly  proven and 
it certainly does require us to accept that no one in Pettigrew’s  division 
is known to have left an account specifying such a formation, but the  
unpalatable alternative is to reject the substantial body of explicit evidence,  both 
Union and Confederate, about Pettigrew’s two lines of battle. 
Okay, I have made my case for  what I see to be the best, albeit imperfect, 
interpretation of the matter.  So, now, what do others in the GDG  think?  
Pettigrew – two lines of  battle or one? 

Bruce  Trinque
Amston, CT





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