GDG- Re:Here we go...Sickles was not suppossed to replace Geary

DShultz180 at aol.com DShultz180 at aol.com
Mon Apr 2 23:10:15 CDT 2007


> <<Meade himself, after all, would not even arrive on the field for several 
> hours yet.>>
> 
Correct, Jim. Meade was not on scene at 7:30 p.m. I did not mean that at 7:30 
pm July 1 Ward was directed to a bivouac area in which it was previously 
conceived he would build a line to hold. If this was conveyed to SIckles, Birney 
or Ward, July 1, it was never noted and or mentioned. We should   take into 
account Clark's concern about the "hundreds" of campfires then visible to the 
west-southwest, however. Although Meade did not arrive until midnight he was 
somewhat kept abreast as he rode north to Cemetery Hill. Stopping to speak with 
Hancock, in rear of LRT, he learned quite a bit in a sort time. Could we 
reasonably assume Hancock possibly pointed out the hill looming above his corps? 
Whatever the case, by the time Meade reached the gatehouse he was well aware of 
LRT and the ridge running south from Cemetery Hill. He decided then and there to 
reconnoiter rather then take one's word. 

Sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 a. m Meade, Howard, Hunt and Tyler, crossed 
paths with Birney somewhere near the Wiekart farm. Hunt specifically recalled 
speaking with Randolph near Birney's HQ. They were at that time in the company 
of Ward's bedded down brigade. They also knew Humphreys demi-division was to 
Ward's front. With that said is it not reasonable to assume Meade then, or 
shortly thereafter, decided to place the entire 3rd corps along that part of the 
line being half of it was already in somewhat of a desirable position? And, if I 
may, there is no way Sickles' corps could have sufficiently covered the line 
beginning at Caldwell running south to include LRT. Had "OL" Dan been 
enlightened that he was to hold the hill on the left then perhaps the LOW ground he 
complained about would not have been quite to untenable as believed. Much of the 
ridge on which he was to hold is to this day lower then that of the 
Emmitsburg Road Rise.   That was his complaint. I do think Humphreys afternoon move 
south has quite a bit of folks ill-advised that that march, with banners flying, 
was ordered on behalf of Meade and the unfounded fact Sickles was to hold LRT 
and not that of the 5th Corps. 

Meade's placing of troops early July 2 was a thought-out process that 
included plenty of input from Howard, Hunt and possibly Birney. Hunt makes no mention 
of crossing paths with either Geary, Sickles and or Humphreys at that early 
hour.   Unfortunately Meade does not mention speaking with Geary while at LRT 
while Hunt stayed below conferring with Lt. Kinzie. When Meade returned from 
the hill he rode east whilst Hunt stayed with Paine-in-the %^$# and Bissle while 
they completed there sketches. I don't believe anything has ever transpired 
as to what Meade and Howard did or saw while on LRT early July 2nd. Why was 
there no mention anywhere that Geary would be leaving shortly? It just don't make 
sense ... as does not the 5th Corps being placed in reserve along Rock Creek 
waiting for the 6th to arrive. And yes, I realize they needed respite. 

To add to the mystery ... Hancock's march early July 2 was held up when 
Geary's men crossed paths with the 2nd corps as it headed north. As I come to 
understand it the traffic jam created when these two columns crossed paths was 
terrible. Hancock's men were assembled at 4:30, roughly about the time Geary 
started his eastward move, or about 90-minutes after Meade had been on the hill. We 
know Geary had yet to depart before Hancock started north as Geary's own son 
described the passing of that ccorps before Atwell's battery retired east 
(Atwell was in "Action Front" fronting south, east of Taneytown Road across from 
Jacob Weikert house). Geary's move and jam must have infuriated the "Superb." 
Do we not think Hancock alerted Meade to Geary's premature departure? Slocum, 
on the other hand, states Meade ordered Geary back while failing to mention the 
time he should depart. 

<<When was Ward ever on LRT?>>

I need not go any further then Birney's O.R.

"At 7 a.m., under orders from Major-General Sickles (did I read 7:00 a.m.), I 
relieved (long gone) Geary's division, and formed a line, it's left resting 
ON Sugar Loaf Mountain and the right thrown in a direct line toward the 
Cemetery ..." 

We can split hairs and suggest that was not what he meant. When the man says 
his left was ON the mountain I tend to believe him ... just as both Bucklyn 
and Clark later confirmed occurred.

<<Wasn't he ordered to?  And wasn't it Sickles who didn't make an effort to 
coordinate with Geary?>>

Who was it who ordered Geary to return to Slocum? I believe it was Slocum 
himself who did the ordering. Until the day he died Meade never mentioned 
ordering Geary off LRT at that early hour July 2. Kinda like the premature Gen. 
Buford departure I reckon. No one really to lay blame on ... it just happened.

And, if I may, it was only Geary who suggested he was relieved by the 3rd 
Corps after having received orders from Slocum to return east. Everything from 
the 3rd Corps and or MEade's HQ relevant to relieving Geary July 2nd is written 
in pastness. 

As far as communicating July 1st goes let's give Sickles a break here. I'd 
suggest protocol would place Geary just as responsible as that of Sickles. One 
would think Geary would see to it his reinforcements were close at hand before 
leaving. Besides, why would Sickles need to coordinate with Geary July 2, 
early a.m. if indeed he did not know he was to relieve him until after the fact?   
How important to all this is my initial question concerning wanting to know 
what general officer it was Capt. Clark saw with Birny July 1? I believe it's 
relevant to all this. If it was Geary with Birney I'd perhaps amend my 
thinking. But because we do not know I'll stick with Sickles and Birney not knowing 
about Geary's relief, the left flank of the AOP, and or LRT until after the 
fact.

<<Meade was essentially working with what might almost be called the AOP's 
default deployment, largely a factor of where the various Corps had ended up at 
the end of the fighting on the 1st, or gone into position was they came up.>>

My point exactly, Jim. Why move Sickles small corps then in somewhat of a 
position when he knew the 5th Corps was on it's way and would probably be there 
before all of Sickles' brigades were up ... which was exactly what happened. We 
could go on and on about this. I just haven't time. What I'd really like to 
know is ... who was it Clark saw with Birney July 1st?

Dave 

Excuse the UN-editing ... just to tired.
>  
> 




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