GDG- Re: Here we go...Sickles was not suppossed to replace Geary

[cameron2 at optonline.net]

<< With that said I humbly disagree with your suggesting Sickles was to take over Geary's position the morning of July 2nd. That position was intended for the 5th Corps on it's arrival. Case in point is the fact Birney sent Ward well to the North after arriving around 7-7:30 pm, July 1, to a position he would  probably be occupying July 2nd. >>
 
Part of the problem with all this is the long-standing misperception that "Geary was on LRT", something which gets repeated all too often.  He actually had at best elements at or on LRT, but the two brigades of his division he had with him really covered a fairly wide area, up about as far as the location of the NJ monument.
 
That said, I doubt the dispositions of the arriving 3rd Corps troops late on the 1st had much if anything to do with any intended position for the 5th Corps the next day.  Meade himself, after all, would not even arrive on the field for several hours yet.  Until he did, no specific plans existed for how the AOP's line of battle would be formed.  And the 5th Corps could well have ended up used in an attack from the other end of the AOP's line. 
 
   
<< At no time July 2nd was it ever intended for Sickles' line to be stretched from near the Hummelbaugh Farm Lane south to LRT. Geary's  premature departure  forced Birney to send Ward to LRT with hopes Sykes' 5th Corps would arrive in  time to cement the line. >>
 
Not sure I agree.  Sickles's orders were clearly to place his left on LRT.  Doing so, from Caldwell's left, would not have overly extended his line.  It must be kept in mind that even if Meade would may have intended to release the 5th Corps from reserve once the 6th Corps arrived to replace it in that role, and redeployed it to the left of the 3rd Corps, that wasn't going to happen until a good deal later in the day, at best.  Meade, in fact, wasn't entirely sure the 6th Corps would even be able to reach Gettysburg on the 2nd, in time to take any real part in the action.  Until such time as it did, and the 5th Corps became available, that sector of Meade's line would need to be secured by the 3rd Corps.
 
When was Ward ever on LRT?
 
Another think to keep in mind is that the initial 3rd Corps positions as the various units arrived late on the 1st were basically bivouac areas, and didn't necessarily equate to positions in the line of battle.  The troops were more or less massed, not deployed in line.   The 2nd Corps divisions, as they came up on Cemetery Ridge were also held very much massed, even though generally along the intended line.  The various brigades were generally in column of regiments, each with only the frontage of a single regiment.  Such a formation could flex considerably on deploying additional regiments on line, as needed, which would have extended Caldwell's division, had it not been pulled out of line to support the 3rd Corps later in the day, well to the south of the Hummelbaugh lane.  
 
 
<<  It was Geary's premature departure that created the myth Sickles was at  fault. It was simple communication ... or lack of. Geary departed way to early.  >>
 
Wasn't he ordered to?  And wasn't it Sickles who didn't make an effort to coordinate with Geary?
 
 
<< Ward was initially placed July 1 where he was supposed to be July 2nd. Meade, Howard and Hunt, spoke with Birney on their recon. They knew where Ward was at 3:00 a.m July 2nd. They knew were Humphreys  was. They knew  were Geary was. >>
 
Meade was essentially working with what might almost be called the AOP's default deployment, largely a factor of where the various Corps had ended up at the end of the fighting on the 1st, or gone into position was they came up.  Just because Meade knew where Sickles' troops were before dawn on the 2nd, didn't necessarily mean they were there because they were suppossed to be there according to some already existing plan for the deployment of the army later that day.  
 
Jim Cameron