GDG- Re: why not blame a well led Union Army

[James Cameron]

<< Interesting point.  I know that Joe Hooker restored morale in the Army of 
the Potomac by improving rations, more consistent pay musters and more 
furloughs.
Would you be so kind as to elaborate?

Thanks.

Charlie

James Cameron <cameron2 at optonline.net> wrote: Esteemed GDG Member 
Contributes:
.  In many way, though, I think the AOP which fought at Gettysburg was
as much, or more, Joe Hooker's AOP. >>

While McClellen rightly gets credit for the creation and initial training of 
the AOP, and certainly had great claim to the loyalty of his troops, I see 
the era of what might be called the "Peninsula Army" as ending with the the 
Battle of Fredericksburg.

Hooker did all the things you say, but I think there was more to it than 
that.  Those were just some of the more visible initiatives.  And they were 
very important, in terms not only of health and morale, but in letting the 
troops know there was somebody at the top actually looking out for them, and 
who knew what he was doing.

More than that, though, I see Hooker as having moved the army from the old 
flags and banners, "man on horseback" model of the early war years, to a 
more "professional" organization.  McClellens AOP was an organization still 
very dependent on a charismatic leader, inspiring the troops, and geared 
toward the next big battle that was going to be, as McClellen himself put 
it, "decisive of the war."  Staff work was limited, and intelligence largely 
a matter of what McClellen himself made out of raw, unfiltered data.  The 
army fought almost as a coalition of its Corps, rather than as a well 
coordinated whole.

 Under Hooker, the army became much more a coherent, functioning military 
machine.  The BMI provided a more finished, analyzed intelligence "product", 
not a mass of raw data dumped on the commanding generals desk.  Staff work 
became more professional, less dependent on bright young aides and foreign 
princes, resulting in better planning (Chancellorsville ended up as such a 
fiasco, it's easy to overlook how good a plan it actually was, and how well 
it was working until Hooker himself lost confidence), coordination between 
Corps, and improved logistics.  McClellen's AOP was focused on the next Big 
Battle that would decide the war.  Hooker's was set up for the long haul.

Looking at it another way, I can envision Hooker fighting a competent battle 
at Gettysburg, had he still been in command of the AOP, even allowing for 
Chancellorsville.  I have a harder time saying that about McClellen.

Jim Cameron