GDG- Lee's management

[Alan D. Brunelle]

Robert Thieman wrote:
> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> John,
>
> He may have decided to sit on a stump and very sedately experience the
> battle at Gettysburg, but he surely did not at Spotsylvania and the mule
> shoe.  I always wondered with his own military experiences and talents, why
> he did not take on a defensive posture on the 2nd day.  Wasn't he thinking,
> at the time, possibly, intel is scarce, uncommon ground, rookie corp
> commanders in 2/3 of his army, Stuart's absence, enemy high ground, my own
> flanks stretched, Longstreet's attitude, protect or constrict my own
> logistics, etc and fight defensively.  I can hear the argument that we won
> the first day and all that, but is not victory, even partially if not
> wholly, better than old and honorable ego. Were not the risk/reward scenario
> under self- analysis?  Or is my hindsight just too much hindsight.  Health
> problems sound inexcusable to me.  If that was the case, pass the torch or
> go back home.  I would enjoy your take on it or any other knowledgeable
> member. 
>
>   
I'm not John, but I'll take a crack:

In "Last Chance For Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign" 
by Bill Ward and Scott Bowden, the authors discuss options available to 
Lee for Day Two, and if I recollect correctly, they included:

(1) Retreat back towards Virginia,
(2) Restructure his line, and assume the defensive
(3) Attempt to flank Meade to the left/north
(4) Attempt to flank Meade to the right/south (as suggested by Longstreet)
(5) Attack

The (paraphrased, and possibly incomplete/incorrect) rationale against 
(2) included things like:

(a) Loss of the initiative; the ANV had earned the initiative, and it 
was not a wise military option to voluntarily lose the initiative 
without good cause

(b) Morale - an integral part of any armies ability to fight is its 
morale; and giving up the initiative after the series of successes - 
including a hard-fought and decisive win on Day One - could negatively 
impact the morale of the Confederate fighting man.

(c) Logistics - to sustain an army of the size of the ANV required large 
amounts of food and water; both of which would rapidly become scarce in 
such a small area. While the AoP could expect to have supplies delivered 
quite readily, the ANV would have a hard time obtaining supplies - as 
its supply chain was quite long, susceptible to being pierced, and to a 
certain extent, as Lee had voluntarily severed it. As long as the army 
was on the move, it could perhaps sustain itself on the countryside; 
once it became stationary, available supplies would be used up quite 
quickly.

(d) Reinforcements - while the AoP could expect troops to arrive (almost 
continuously), the ANV had all it ever would have. In fact, one argument 
would be that while with the notable exception of Pickett's division and 
(at that point) Stuart's calvary, Lee would have his best overall odds 
on Day Two when compared to waiing a day or two (or more). Lee believed 
Meade was coming up hard, and the sooner he hit, the more likely he'd 
find Meade with fewer troops - and, the more likely that those troops 
that _were_ there could quite possibly be tired from hard marching.

The basic goal for assuming the defensive would be to entice Meade to 
attack and thrash *his* forces a la Fredericksburg. It's probably not 
too likely that (a) Meade would do so (he was a bit more cautious then 
Burnside in this regard), and (b) Meade most _likely_ wouldn't have done 
so until all of his forces were up, in which case we get back to the 
logistics and reinforcements issues.

To address your specific points:

(a) Intel being scarce: given that Lee was somewhat handicapped in this 
regard, he had to go on with his limited intel on hand. And that 
probably told him that Meade was hurrying up troops, and that they would 
then most likely be tired from the hard marching. Given that, it was 
probably best to get on with the show quickly.

(b) Uncommon ground - not quite sure what this means

(c) Rookie corps commanders in 2/3 of his army - well, Ewell surely 
showed himself to be a good Corps Commander during June and the first 
day of July. And: how else does one grow from being a rookie except by 
experience? If he didn't feel that those he chose could do the job when 
needed, then that would be a sad state of affairs.

(d) Stuart's absense - as noted above, waiting was probably not going to 
help the overall situation.

(e) Enemy on the high ground - confidence in his troops probably led him 
to believe that they could overcome this. And, I believe, Lee's plan was 
to primarily attack where there wasn't high ground - Longstreet was 
initially aimed up the Emmitsburg, which was more sloping (especially 
once one had taken over the Peach area, which - remember - Lee knew to 
be unoccupied).

(f) Flanks stretched - in my view, it's pretty clear Lee should have 
stuck to his guns and pulled Ewell back around to the right, or shift 
everyone right. With a limited staff, the extended line was always going 
to be a liability.

(g) Longstreet's attitude - you don't command an army and base a plan 
upon one of your corps commanders attitude. You either assume that he'll 
do the best he can when given a direct order, or you remove him.

Alan